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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, uncertainty has reigned as the state water law system in
Oklahoma. With final issuance of the Franco-American decision in
1993,1 the Oklahoma Supreme Court settled, if not necessarily clari-
fied, the state's approach to the use and allocation of surface waters
and brought water into the forefront of the state's policy concerns.2
But the state law system of allocating water rights is only part of the
water saga. A crucial piece of the water allocation system in
Oklahoma, as elsewhere in the western United States, will be the
rights of Indians and Indian tribes to water resources.
Oklahoma is the successor to the Indian Territory. It is home
today to thirty-six federally recognized Indian tribes3 and their Indian
country.4 Despite the weight of Indian presence in Oklahoma, the
Indian water wars that have raged throughout the West for the past
few decades are only now peering over Oklahoma's borders. If any
lesson emerges from the water wars of the West, however, it is that
ignoring Indian water rights only ensures and escalates conflict. Rec-
ognizing and accounting for Indian rights to water may not avoid all
conflict, but ultimately it benefits both the tribes and the non-Indian
users dependent upon a stable and certain supply of water. As the
State of Oklahoma grapples with water issues, it will eventually and
unavoidably be faced with Indian claims to water. How the State and
1. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568
(Okla. 1990). Although the decision was issued in 1990, it was readopted and reissued in 1993.
2. For an explanation and discussion of the Franco-American litigation, see Gary D. Al-
lison, Franco-American Charolaise: The Never Ending Story, 30 TULSA L. 1 (1994).
3. DIRECTORY OF INDIAN NATIONS AND TRIBAL COURTS IN OKLAHOMA 1-3 (1990). The
State has the largest number of Indians of any state in the nation, and ranks third in the percent-
age of Indians in the population. STATE AND METRoPoLrrAN AREA DATA BOOK XV (4th ed.
1991).
4. Indian country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
... and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
All three types of Indian country are present in Oklahoma. See State ex rel May v. Seneca-
Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985) and State v. Klindt, 782 P.2d 401 (Okla. Crim. App.
1989) (holding trust and restricted allotments are Indian country); Housing Authority v. Hajo,
790 P.2d 1098 (Okla. 1990) (recognizing dependent Indian communities). In particular, the
United States Supreme Court has determined that the meaning of "reservation" in § 1151(a)
encompasses lands set aside under federal protection for tribal use, whether those lands are
formally designated as reservations or not. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation,
113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991, 1993 (1993). So-called "informal" reservations-tribal trust lands not nec-
essarily within the formal boundaries of a reservation-qualify as Indian country under
§ 1151(a). Id.
[Vol. 30:61
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the tribes choose to resolve the water issues will significantly impact
water policy in Oklahoma.
Indian rights to water are rights arising under federal law, im-
pliedly reserved for tribes whenever lands were set aside as Indian
reservations. The basic principles of Indian reserved rights to water
are few and relatively simple. First, the rights vest as of the date the
reservation was created; in western appropriation states, accordingly,
the date of the reservation is the priority date of the water right. Sec-
ond, the measure of the right is sufficient water to fulfill the purposes
for which the reservation was set aside. And third, the rights are not
lost through non-use, but may be asserted at any time.
But this simplicity is deceptive. Because of their early priority
dates and often sizable quantity, Indian reserved rights to water, if not
timely recognized and accommodated, have the potential to disrupt
state appropriation systems of water rights. The possible effects on
state-created water rights raise both practical concerns of economics
and administration and emotionally-charged responses. In addition,
the implementation and application of the basic principles of the re-
served rights doctrine have generated a host of issues regarding the
scope and extent of Indian water rights, as well as their adjudication
and administration.
This article provides an introduction to this important area that is
only now surfacing in Oklahoma. It surveys the basic doctrines of In-
dian reserved fights to water, noting the relatively few areas that,
more than 85 years after the Supreme Court first recognized Indian
reserved rights, are established and secure, and highlighting the many
issues that remain unresolved.
II. ORIGINs OF THE RESERVED RIGHTS DocTRIN_
Most reserved fights to water are traceable to the 1908 decision in
Winters v. United States,5 a case brought by the United States in its
5. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). But see 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 204-05,220-22 (Robert E.
Beck ed., 1991) [hereinafter WATERS] (arguing that while Winters is the foundation case for
rights created when a reservation is set aside, tribes also exercise recognized aboriginal rights to
water for purposes pre-existing the reservations and that those reserved rights have their origin
in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)).
1994]
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capacity as trustee6 to protect the Fort Belknap Reservation in Mon-
tana against upstream diversions of water from the Milk River.7 The
Fort Belknap Reservation was created by statute in 1888,8 with its
northern border formed by the center of the Milk River.9 The follow-
ing year, the year in which Montana was admitted to the Union,10 the
federal government began diverting water from the Milk River for the
domestic and irrigation needs of the Indian agents.1" In 1898, the gov-
ernment began a reservation irrigation project, irrigating some 30,000
acres." At about the same time, non-Indian irrigators constructed di-
version works on tributaries of the Milk River upstream of the reser-
vation. 3 In 1905, a drought reduced the water flow below that
6. The trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes arguably has its
origins in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16, 17 (1831), in which the Court
termed Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations" whose relationship with the United States
"resembles that of a ward to his guardian." See generally FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 16-17 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN's HAND-
BOOK]. Other commentators have credited the trust concept to nineteenth century views of
federal "plenary" power over Indian affairs. See Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, Con.
trary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterways Before and After Montana v. United
States, 56 WASH. L. REv. 627,645 (1981); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Courts, Indian Tribes, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 63 (1987). On the question of federal power generally, see Nell J.
Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 195
(1984).
7. Winters, 207 U.S. at 564.
8. Reservations were generally created by treaty until 1871, when Congress terminated
treaty-making with the Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988). Thereafter reservations were cre-
ated by statutes, generally ratifying agreements reached with the tribes, as in Winters. Between
1855 and 1919, numerous reservations were also created by executive order. COHEN's HAND.
BOOK, supra note 6, at 493. The Winters doctrine applies to Indian reservations regardless of the
means by which they were created. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 598 (1963).
9. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
10. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that it made no difference in application of the
Winters doctrine whether Indian reservations were created before or after statehood. Arizona I,
373 U.S. at 597-98. Arizona had argued that once it was admitted on an equal footing and
acquired ownership of the lands underlying navigable waters, the federal government lost the
power to reserve those waters. Id. The Court found, however, that state ownership of the bed-
lands did not deprive the United States of its constitutional powers to reserve water rights for
reservations and federal property. Id.
11. Id. at 566.
12. Id.
13. The non-Indian defendants claimed that they had diverted water to a beneficial use
before the United States or the tribes appropriated water. Winters, 207 U.S. at 568-69. The
United States asserted that water was diverted to reservation uses "long prior to the acts of the
defendants complained of". Id. at 566. The truth was apparently somewhere in between; the
lower court found that some of the defendants' diversions preceded the reservation appropria-
tion and some did not. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1906).
If tribal rights to water had depended upon state appropriation law, which party first di-
verted the water and put it to a beneficial use (such as irrigation) would have been crucial.
Under prior appropriation law, the first appropriator to divert water and put it to a beneficial
use has prior rights as against all subsequent diverters. See, eg., Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). Given the Court's disposition of the
controversy in Winters, however, the tribes' priority of actual use became irrelevant.
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necessary to meet both the non-Indian and Indian needs, and the gov-
ernment brought suit to protect the Fort Belknap diversion. 14
The Supreme Court held that the Fort Belknap tribes enjoyed the
paramount right to the water, basing its analysis on the fundamental
purpose of the reservation system, the practical need for water in the
arid west, and the canons of construction for Indian treaties and
agreements. 15 First, the Court noted that the purpose of the reserva-
tion was to turn the tribes from a nomadic, hunting culture to one of a
"pastoral and civilized" nature. 6 And yet the arid lands set aside for
the tribes were inadequate, indeed "valueless," in their natural unirri-
gated state to support an agrarian community.1 7 Given the purpose of
the reservation, and the centrality of water to that purpose, the Court
found an implied reservation of water for the Fort Belknap tribes.18
Moreover, the Court found, it was irrelevant that no express reserva-
tion of water was made, since all ambiguities in the agreement, such as
silence concerning the water, were to be interpreted in favor of the
14. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
15. Id. at 576-77.
16. Id. at 576. The federal reservation policy, in effect from approximately the mid-1840s
until the mid-1880s, was intended to ease conflicts between Indians and whites, prevent the de-
struction of the tribes, and eventually transform the Indians into Christian agriculturists. 1
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 317 (1984). As Indian Commissioner William P. Dole stated in 1862, "the
policy, recently adopted, of confining the Indians to reservations.., is the best method yet
devised for their reclamation and advancement in civilization." Annual Report of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs (1862), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 95
(Francis P. Prucha ed., 2d ed. 1990).
17. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
18. Whether those water rights were reserved by the tribes, or by the federal government
for the tribes, remains a source of controversy. There is language in Winters supporting both
views. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
Language in support of the latter view is found in the Court's discussion of the state's claim
that even if the waters were reserved when the reservation was created, the waters reverted to
the state the following year when it was admitted to the Union upon an equal footing. Id. In
rejecting Montana's argument, the Court stated: "The power of the Government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be.
That the Government did reserve them we have decided...." L. at 577 (citations omitted). In
the preceding paragraph, however, the Court implied that the tribes reserved the water "The
Indians had command of the lands and the waters... Did they give up all this? Did they reduce
the area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate?... The
Government is asserting the rights of the Indians." Id. at 576.
Three years prior to Winters, the Court decided the Indian treaty rights case of United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Justice McKenna was the author of both opinions. In
Winans, McKenna wrote that "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of
rights from them-a reservation of those not granted." Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. Logically, then,
since the tribes in Winters did not grant (i.e., give up) their water rights when they ceded their
aboriginal territory in exchange for the reservation, those rights should have been reserved to
them under Winans. However, the only cite to Winans in the Winters case comes during the
equal footing discussion. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. McKenna cited Winans only for the proposi-
tion that the federal government had the power to reserve waters from state appropriation. Id.
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tribes.19 Based on that standard, the Court determined that the tribes
would not have agreed to a territory too small to support their former
nomadic life, but at the same time have given up the only thing-
water-that would make the remaining land adequate to support
them.20 Accordingly, the Court ruled, the creation of the reservation
impliedly reserved water rights as of the date the reservation was cre-
ated.21 For the Fort Belknap tribes, that meant a water right for irri-
gation which vested in 1888, several years prior to the upstream non-
Indian diversions.2
The Winters decision thus introduced the basic themes of tribal
water rights. The creation of an Indian reservation impliedly reserves
water rights to the tribe or tribes occupying the territory. Those water
rights are reserved in order to carry out the purposes for which the
lands were set aside, and the rights are paramount to later-asserted
water rights perfected under state law.
III. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF RESERVED RIGHTS
To date, Winters rights have been litigated in appropriation
states.23 Because tribal reserved rights and state law appropriation
rights must be meshed into a workable system, Winters rights "cannot
be understood apart from" the state doctrine of prior appropriation.24
The basic features of the appropriation doctrine in use throughout the
19. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77. The principle that ambiguities in treaties, agreements, and
statutes should be resolved in favor of the Indians is one of the "canons of construction" of
federal Indian law. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 221. The other primary canons are
that treaties and agreements should be interpreted as the Indians understood them, and should
be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians. Id. at 221-22. For an exploration of the origins of
the canons in the cases of Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1820s and 1830s, and the use or
misuse of the canons by modem Courts, see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381
(1993).
20. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. Professor Tarlock asserts that the "broader principle" of Win-
ters is that Indian tribes "are entitled to some measure of resource security as an attribute of
tribal sovereignty." A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water
Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 631, 643 (1987).
21. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
22. As noted, the non-Indian defendants disputed which party first actually diverted the
water to a beneficial use. There was no dispute, however, that the defendants had not appropri-
ated water from the Milk River prior to the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation. Since the
Tribes' priority date was the date the reservation was set aside and not the date that water was
put to an actual beneficial use on the reservation, the Tribes were the senior appropriator on the
Milk River.
23. Winters rights have not been rejected in riparian jurisdictions. Rather, with the possible
exception of Arizona v. California, see infra section VII.B, no case has addressed the issue.
24. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 576.
[Vol. 30:61
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western United States in one form or another were summarized by the
Supreme Court:
Under that [prior appropriation] doctrine, one acquires a right to
water by diverting it from its natural source and applying it to some
beneficial use. Continued beneficial use of the water is required in
order to maintain the right. In periods of shortage, priority among
confirmed rights is determined according to the date of initial
diversion.
The following sections explore the issues raised in determining the
scope and extent of tribal reserved rights to water against the back-
drop of the prior appropriation system.
A. Waters Subject to the Right
Water unappropriated at the creation of a reservation is subject
to Winters rights. That is, water which is already subject to vested
appropriation rights as of the date of creation of the reservation is not
available to fulfill Winters rights.26 In most cases, however, there are
few state appropriation rights that predate Indian reservations27 and
thus little water that is removed from the reach of the Winters
doctrine.
Reserved rights have generally been adjudicated or settled for
surface waters that abut or run through the reservations. 8 No court,
however, has ever expressly limited Winters rights to waters appurte-
nant to the reservation, and the Supreme Court has affirmed reserved
water rights in the Colorado River for a reservation which is not adja-
cent to the river. 29 It would appear, therefore, that tribal reserved
25. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,805 (1976); See
also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 5.09[l], 5.10 (1988). In
common parlance, the latter two principles are generally known as "use it or lose it" and "first in
time, first in right."
26. Appropriation rights vested as of the creation of an Indian reservation carry an earlier
priority date than the tribal rights.
27. See, eg., New Mexico ex rel Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235,238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993),
cerL denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993) (noting that a priority date based on the Mescalero Apache
Tribe's peace treaty of 1852 would give it the senior water right since the area was not settled by
non-Indians until after that date).
28. In the Winters case itself, water rights were adjudicated in the Milk River, which formed
the northern boundary of the Fort Belknap Reservation of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine
Tribes. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). One of the arguments raised by the
non-Indian appropriators, but not addressed by the Court, was that the reservation needs for
water could be satisfied from springs and streams located within the reservation boundaries. Id
at 570.
29. One of the five Indian reservations with water rights at issue in Arizona v. California
was the Cocopah Reservation. The Court affirmed the Master's award of water rights to that
reservation, which lies about two miles from the river. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373
1994)
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rights may be satisfied from any available source of surface water,
with a strong preference for reservation-based streams.3 0
The major remaining issue concerning waters subject to tribal
Winters rights is that of groundwater. The only court to directly ad-
dress the issue of a Winters right to groundwater held that no such
right existed." The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that: "The logic
which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater. '3 2 None-
theless, the court held that reserved rights did not extend to ground-
water, on the basis that no other court had ever found such a right.33
Although technically accurate, the statement is somewhat mis-
leading. 4 In Cappaert v. United States,5 the Supreme Court did not
reach the issue of a federal reserved right to groundwater because it
found that an underground pool was in fact surface water.3 6 Nonethe-
less, the Court held that junior diversions from both surface and
groundwater could be enjoined to protect the federal reserved right to
water for the underground pool.3 7 Relying on Cappaert, a federal dis-
trict court held that Pueblo water rights extend to "the surface waters
U.S. 546,595 n.97, 600 (1963). The Court did not address the fact that the Cocopah Reservation
was not contiguous to the River.
30. See CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 585 (positing that tribes should have Winters
rights in waters near reservations when the off-reservation waters are the only feasible source of
supply); Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of Our Discontent, 88 YALE L.J. 1689,
1699 (1979). But see Harry B. Sondheim & John R. Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A
Retrogression to Quasi-Riparianism?, 34 S. CAt L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1960).
In addition, one court has limited the water sources from which tribal rights may be satis-
fied. The Federal Circuit held that an enlargement of the Gila River Reservation, which brought
the boundary of the reservation to the junction of the Gila and Salt Rivers and included four
miles of land riparian to the Salt River, did not reserve to the tribe any water rights in the Salt
River for lands other than 1490 acres for which a canal system had been developed. The tribe's
sources of water, the court held, were limited to the Gila River and groundwater. Gila River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 695 F.2d 559, 561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
31. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
(Big Horn 1), 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988), affd by an equally divided Supreme Court sub
nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Big Horn I].
32. Id. at 99.
33. Id.
34. The Big Horn I court distinguished each of the cases noted in the text on the basis that
not one of them held as a matter of law essential to the decision that Winters reserved rights
encompass groundwater as well as surface water.
35. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
36. IL at 142. In Cappaert, the Court upheld a federal reserved water right for an under-
ground pool in the Devil's Hole National Monument. Id. at 147. The pool was home to the
Devil's Hole pupfish, a species unique to the pool. Id. at 133. Nearby groundwater pumping
under state permits was lowering the water table in the pool, endangering the fish species. Id.
37. hd at 143.
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of the stream systems and the ground water physically interrelated to
the surface water as an integral part of the hydrologic cycle."3
The Federal Circuit similarly noted that one source of irrigation
water reserved for the Gila River Reservation was groundwater. 9
Another federal district court reasoned that the Winters right should
extend to groundwater as well as surface water, although that analysis
was not necessary to the decision in the case.40 On a more practical
level, a number of Indian water settlements have expressly included a
right to groundwater.4'
The Wyoming Supreme Court's rejection of a Winters right to
groundwater has been criticized on several grounds.42 First, as the
court itself noted,43 the hydrologic interconnection between surface
water and groundwater demands that the two sources be governed by
the same rules.44 Second, in some instances, groundwater may repre-
sent a more economical, more readily available, or higher quality al-
ternative to surface water. And third, the Wyoming court's decision
seemed to be based less on legal reasons than on the court's reluc-
tance to be the first to find a Winters right to groundwater.45
Nonetheless, the existence of that right remains questionable. On
the one hand, the "logic" of unitary management of surface and
groundwater supports extending Winters rights at least to tributary
groundwater, and that approach has considerable support in dicta and
in holdings on related issues. On the other hand, the only court to
38. New Mexico ex reL Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1010 (D.N.M. 1985). For
sources of information on Pueblo water rights, see infra note 53.
39. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 695 F.2d 559,561 (Fed.
Cir. 1982).
40. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968).
41. 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 261-62. For a case study of the Ak Chin and Tohono
O'Odham groundwater settlement acts, see LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER
RIGHTS AND THE Limnrrs OF LAW 87-123 (1991).
42. See generally 4 WATERs, supra note 5, at 233-34; Paige Graening, Judicial Failure to
Recognize a Reserved Groundwater Right for the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming, 27
TULSA Li. 1 (1991). For a different approach, see Gwendolyn Griffith, Note, Indian Claims to
Groundwater: Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest, 33 STAN. L. REV. 103 (1980) (rejecting a
reserved right to groundwater as inefficient and unfair to non-Indians, and proposing instead,
tribal rights to groundwater based on beneficial ownership of the overlying land base).
43. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 99.
44. See also New Mexico ex rel Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993,1010 (1985) (holding
that Pueblo water rights extend to groundwater hydrologically connected to surface waters); In
re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source,
857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993) (noting that Arizona's approach of treating groundwater and surface
water differently is "artificial and fluid").
45. In fact, the court offered not a single reason why groundwater should not be included in
a Winters right determination.
1994]
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directly address the issue has rejected a reserved right to ground-
water.46 While the Wyoming court's rejection was not adequately ex-
plained and finds little if any support in the existing case law or among
commentators,47 it remains the only direct holding on the application
of the Winters doctrine to groundwater.
B. Priority Date
The first-in-time, first-in-right ranking of water rights under the
prior appropriation system helps guarantee certainty and stability in
western water law. In order for Indian water rights to intersect with
the prior appropriation system-in order to determine the tribes'
place in the ranking system-tribal reserved rights to water need pri-
ority dates. Indian water rights generally carry a priority date either
of the date of creation of the reservation or of time immemorial, de-
pending upon the type of right involved and whether the use of the
water predated the reservation of the tribal territory.
The Winters decision set the basic standard for tribal priority
dates. In general, the priority date of tribal water rights impliedly re-
served when a reservation is set aside, is the date of creation of the
reservation.48 In most states, because Indian reservations were set
aside well before significant non-Indian appropriations were per-
fected, tribal rights to water will predate most non-Indian uses.49
Some tribal rights to water have a priority date of "time immemo-
rial."50 In general, if a tribe was using water in its aboriginal territory
prior to the creation of the reservation and those uses were confirmed
by the treaty, agreement, or executive order creating the reservation,
46. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 76.
47. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 585; TARLOCK, supra note 25 at § 9.07[3]
(contending that "little, if any, doubt remains that Indian tribes have groundwater as well as
surface water rights.").
48. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963); see also Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. at 564, 577 (1908) (noting that the water rights were reserved as of the date of
the agreement). A reservation may be "created" for purposes of Winters rights before the bor-
ders of the reservation are finally determined. See New Mexico ex rel Martinez v. Lewis, 861
P.2d 235, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the 1852 peace treaty with the Mescalero
Apache Tribe, not the 1873 executive order which settled the boundaries, created the reservation
for purposes of water rights), cert. denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993).
49. In one case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals refused to address the Mescalero
Apache Tribe's claim to water rights with a priority date of time immemorial. Lewis, 861 P.2d at
238. Because the THbe's priority date based on its peace treaty was 1852, and because the area
was not settled by non-Indians until after 1852, the court held the Tribe would hold the senior
water right in any case. Lewis, 861 P.2d at 238.
50. Time immemorial, of course, would give tribes the senior priority date.
[Vol. 30:61
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the water rights continue with a "time immemorial" priority date.5'
For tribes historically dependent upon fishing, for example, water for
preservation of the fisheries should carry a priority date of time imme-
morial.52 Time immemorial priorities for irrigation water have been
recognized for tribes such as the Pueblos which historically engaged in
irrigated agriculture. 3
C. Purposes of the Reservation
Under the Winters doctrine, water rights are reserved in order to
carry out the government's purpose in creating the reservation. In
Winters itself, the purpose of the Fort Belknap Reservation, the Court
found, mirrored the general federal purpose of the national reserva-
tion policy in effect during the mid to late nineteenth century. 54 That
general purpose was to transform the tribes into a "pastoral and civi-
lized" community.5 The tribes, therefore, were entitled to water for
irrigation in order to make the land productive for agricultural uses.
Subsequently, in a non-Indian reserved rights case, the Supreme
Court distinguished between primary and secondary purposes of fed-
eral reservations. 6 In United States v. New Mexico, 7 the question was
the amount of water reserved for the Gila National Forest. The Court
51. "Such water rights necessarily carry a priority date of time immemorial. The rights were
not created by the 1864 Treaty, rather, the treaty confirmed the continued existence of these
rights." United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1252
(1984). See also Montana ex reL Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754,
764 (Mont. 1985). These "time immemorial" rights may owe their origin more to the treaty case
of Winans than to the water rights case of Winters. See 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 204-05 and
221-22.
52. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1413-15.
53. See New Mexico ex rel Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993, 1009-10 (D.N.M. 1985).
See also 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 223 n. 165 (noting an unpublished decision awarding time
immemorial irrigation rights to the Pima Indians of the Gila River Reservation).
While some lands held by Indian pueblos may carry Winters rights, see Aamodt, 618 F.
Supp. at 1010, the origin of Pueblo water rights is rooted in Spanish and Mexican law. Those
water rights, their origins and their extent, are complex and beyond the scope of this primer. For
discussions of Pueblo Indian rights, see CHARLES T. DUMARS, ET. AL, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER
RIGHTs: STRUGGLE FOR A PRECIOUS RESOURCE (1984); Ed Newville, Comment, Pueblo Indian
Water Rights: Overview and Update on the Aamodt Litigation, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 251 (1989);
A. Patrick Maynez, Note, Pueblo Indian Water Rights: Who Will Get the Water?, 18 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 639 (1978).
54. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
55. Id
56. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978). The New Mexico holding was
based on an earlier non-Indian case which imported the Winters purpose-of-the-reservation ap-
proach into federal water rights for non-Indian reservations of land. Cappaert v. United States,
426 U.S. 128 (1976). In Cappaert, the Court noted that the reserved rights doctrine "reserves
only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more." ld. at
141.
57. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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examined the national forest legislation and concluded that the pri-
mary purposes of national forests were timber management and con-
servation of water flows, while aspects such as fish and wildlife,
recreation, aesthetics, and environmental protection were merely sec-
ondary purposes.5 8 The Court then held that water is impliedly re-
served only for the primary purposes of federal reservations.5 9 Water
for secondary purposes must be obtained under state law.60
The Supreme Court has not applied this principle to Indian water
rights,61 and other courts have not developed a uniform approach to
the purposes of Indian reservations. Instead, in the state and lower
federal courts, the purposes of the reservation depend upon the
courts' willingness to interpret federal intentions broadly or narrowly.
The Ninth Circuit has taken a broad approach to the purposes of
Indian reservations. In a case involving the Colville Reservation, set
apart by executive order "as a reservation for said Indians, '' 61 the
court ruled that the "general purpose" of Indian reservations was to
provide the tribes with homelands.63 Construing that general purpose
liberally in favor of the tribes,64 the court held that the primary pur-
poses of the Colville Reservation were both agriculture and fisheries
preservation.65 The court noted that the Colville Tribes were a tradi-
58. Id. at 707-08. The Court bolstered its conclusion by contrasting the national forest legis-
lation to that for national parks. Congress expressly directed that national parks were estab-
lished for the "fundamental purpose" of conservation of scenery, historic and natural objects,
and wildlife. Id. at 709.
59. Id. at 702.
60. That is, in an appropriation jurisdiction, the federal government may perfect additional
water rights under state law, if water is available for appropriation. Id. ("Where water is only
valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that
Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in
the same manner as any other public or private appropriator.").
61. On the other hand, the Court has not decided an Indian water rights case since New
Mexico. The Court did grant certiorari in part in Big Horn L Big Horn 1, supra note 31, at 76.
The only issue on which the Court granted review, however, did not involve determining the
purposes of the reservation. See infra note 92.
62. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton 1), 647 F.2d 42, 47 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
63. Id. at 47, 49; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 588.
64. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 47 & n.9. See supra note 19 (discussing the canons of construction
in Indian law).
65. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 47-48. See also United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); In re the Determination of the Rights to the Use of
the Surface Waters of the Yakima River Drainage Basin, 850 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Wash. 1993). As
the court noted in Adair "Neither Cappaert nor New Mexico requires us to choose between
these activities [fishing and farming] or to identify a single essential purpose which the parties to
the 1864 Treaty intended the Klamath Reservation to serve." Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410.
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss1/2
INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
tional fishing culture and that preservation of their access to historic
fishing sites was one purpose for establishing the reservation.66
Other courts, by contrast, have taken a strict approach to inter-
preting the purposes of the reservation. The Wyoming Supreme
Court recently rejected the homeland concept for the Wind River
tribes.67 Despite language in the 1868 treaty setting the Wind River
Reservation aside as a "permanent home" for the tribes,68 and despite
the finding of the special master that the Wind River Reservation was
intended as a permanent homeland,69 the court found that that lan-
guage did "nothing more than permanently set aside lands for the In-
dians; it does not define the purpose of the reservation." 70
Recognizing that the treaty "clearly contemplates" activities other
than farming,7' 1 the court nonetheless held that "the treaty encouraged
only agriculture, and that was its primary purpose. '72 The court was
expressly unwilling, in the absence of a specific treaty provision, to
recognize a fisheries purpose for the Wind River tribes, who were not
historically dependent upon fisheries for their livelihood.7 3 The court
was willing, however, to find that certain uses were "subsumed"
66. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 48; see also Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409. Both the Colville Tribes (in
Walton) and the Kiamath Tribe (in Adair) are located in the Pacific Northwest, where tribes
were historically dependent upon the fisheries for their subsistence, their livelihood, and their
culture. On the issue of a Winters right to water to protect treaty-reserved fishing rights, see
David F. Coursen, Comment, Reserved Rights: Water for Fish Protection and the 1983 Indian
Water Rights Decisions, 63 OF- L. REv. 699 (1984).
67. For general criticism of the Wyoming court's ruling on the purposes of the Wind River
Reservation, see Peg Rogers, Note, In re Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River, 30 NAT.
REsouRCEs J. 439 (1990). See also Tom Kinney, Comment, Chasing the Wind: Wyoming
Supreme Court Decision in Big Horn III Denies Beneficial Use for Instream Flow Protection, But
Empowers State to Administer Federal Indian Reserved Water Right Awarded to the Wind River
Tribes, 33 NAT. RsOURCES J. 841, 871 (1993) (suggesting that a negotiated settlement of the
Wind River Tribes' water rights expressly recognize a homeland purpose for the reservation).
68. Treaty with the Eastern Band Shoshoni and Bannock, July 3, 1868, 15 Stat. 673, re-
printed in 2 INDIAN AnnAins: LAWS AND TREArIEs 1020 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1903). Article
2 of the treaty set the Wind River Reservation apart "for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation" of the tribes. Article 4 provided that the tribes "will make said reservation their
permanent home, and they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere".
69. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 85.
70. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 97.
71. The court specifically noted the treaty's mention of the activities of hunting, milling, and
lumbering. Id. See David M. Stanton, Note, Is There a Reserved Water Right for Wildlife on the
Wind River Indian Reservation?-A Critical Analysis of the Big Horn River General Adjudica-
tion, 35 S.D. L. REv. 326 (1990) (arguing that because the treaty preserved the tribes' hunting
rights and because hunting was vitally important to the tribes, the court should have found that
wildlife preservation was one purpose of the Wind River Reservation).
72. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 97. The court ostensibly made this finding after application of
the canons of construction, see id. at 96-97, which mandate that treaties be interpreted liberally
and as the tribes would have understood them.
73. Id, at 98. The court likewise expressly refused to recognize wildlife and aesthetics or
mineral and industrial development as purposes of the Wind River Reservation. Id. at 98-99.
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within the agricultural purpose, including livestock watering, and mu-
nicipal, domestic, and commercial uses.74
D. Quantification of the Right
With the exception of occasional litigation75 or acts of Congress
applicable to particular reservations, 76 tribal rights to water in the de-
cades after Winters were relegated to the legal attic. Indian reserved
rights to water did not begin to have a widespread significant impact
on western water use and allocation until the 1963 decision in Arizona
v. California,7 7 which quantified the Winters rights of five tribes to the
Colorado River.
The method of quantifying Indian water rights depends upon the
purposes which those water rights are intended to fulfill. Since agri-
culture is either one or the sole purpose of all reservations, 7 the pri-
mary measure of tribal water rights is an agricultural measure. In
Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court affirmed the Special
Master's ruling that the appropriate measure of Indian rights was
practicably irrigable acreage (PIA).79 The Court expressly rejected
Arizona's suggested approach of the tribes' "reasonably foreseeable
needs" on the ground that it would introduce too much uncertainty
into western water law.80
74. Id. at 99. It is not clear what the court meant by "commercial" uses that are subsumed
within an agricultural purpose, particularly since the court expressly rejected any "industrial"
purpose for the Wind River Reservation. Since the court distinguished the two, however, it
would appear that the tribes are entitled to water based on any economic development purpose
other than one considered purely "industrial."
75. See, eg., United States ex reL Ray v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928); United States
v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
76. See, eg., Act of August 1, 1914, ch. 222, 38 Stat. 582 (awarding a minimum of 720 cubic
feet per second during irrigation season to the Yakima Nation) (discussed in In re the Matter of
the Determination of the Rights to the Use of the Surface Waters of the Yakima River Drainage
Basin, 850 P.2d 1306, 1321-22 (Wash. 1993)).
77. 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona 1).
78. No case has rejected an agricultural purpose for any reservation. In addition, no court
is likely to reject farming as a purpose, since one 'of the goals of the reservation policy was to
establish agrarian communities.
79. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600-01. The Court noted that the PIA standard would provide
sufficient water "to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations".
Id. at 600. Under the PIA standard, the Court affirmed the Master's award of approximately
900,000 acre feet, calculated on the basis of approximately 135,000 practicably irrigable acres.
Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (decree entered).
80. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 600-01. The Court noted that "reasonably foreseeable needs" is a
standard which depends upon the population of the tribes. Id. "How many Indians there will be
and what their future needs will be can only be guessed." Id. For a survey of the various quanti-
fication standards suggested by courts prior to Arizona I, see Rebecca E. Wardlaw, Comment,
The Irrigable Acres Doctrine, 15 NAT. REsOURCES J. 375, 379-81 (1975).
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The determination of practicably irrigable acreage requires a two-
part analysis.8 First, the land must be physically irrigable: that is, the
land must be capable of sustained irrigation on the basis of both
arability and engineering feasibility. Second, the land must be eco-
nomically irrigable: that is, it must be capable of irrigation at a reason-
able cost.82
The PIA standard is the subject of considerable criticism. States
often characterize PIA as a "windfall" for the tribes, providing them
with far more water than they actually need.83 Alternatively, PIA
may provide insufficient water for tribes with few irrigable acres but
other resources that, with adequate water, could provide an economic
base for the reservation.' PIA is also criticized as locking tribes in to
nineteenth century notions at a time when agriculture is no longer
necessarily profitable.85 More specifically, the economic feasibility
prong of the PIA standard has come under attack. Economic feasibil-
ity has been criticized as inexact and easily manipulated, requiring the
kind of guesswork and policy choices that PIA was designed to
avoid.86 It has also been criticized for requiring an all-or-nothing ap-
proach: either the tribe's proposal is economically feasible and the
81. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 101-05; New Mexico ex reL Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d
235,247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993). See also Arizona v. Califor-
nia (Arizona I), 460 U.S. 605, 641 n.31 (1983), reh'g denied, 462 U.S. 1146 (1983).
82. See H.S. Burness et al., The "New" Arizona v. California: Practicably Irrigable Acreage
and Economic Feasibility, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1982) (praising the Special Master for
introducing the concept of economic feasibility into the determination of PIA). Economic feasi-
bility (cost-benefit) is distinguishable from financial feasibility (ability to repay costs). Id. at 518-
19.
83. Walter Rusinek, Note, A Preview of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and
the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 EcoLooY L.Q. 355,395 (1990) (quoting Wyoming's brief to the
Supreme Court). Wyoming resurrected the idea of a needs-based quantification, the standard
that the Court expressly rejected in Arizona v. California.
84. Wardlaw, supra note 80, at 382.
85. Lynnette J. Boomgaarden, Note, Water Law-Quantification of Federal Reserved Indian
Water Rights-"Practicably Irrigable Acreage" Under Fire: The Search for a Better Legal Stan-
dard, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 417,431 (1990); Susan M. Campbell, Note, A Proposal for the
Quantification of Reserved Indian Water Rights, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1313 (1974).
86. As one commentator notes:
A PIA feasibility analysis can be easily manipulated to either maximize or minimize the
reserved water claim. Small differences in the economic variables used to compute
costlbenefit ratios can lead to very different feasibility conclusions. For example, a 1%
variance in discount rate estimates can mean the difference between economic feasibil-
ity and a nonviable irrigation project. Expert testimony during the Big Horn adjudica-
tion proposed discount rates ranging from 1% - 11%. It follows that the Indians'
evidence to maximize their allotment or the States' evidence to minimize the Indian
allotment is limited only by the ingenuity of counsel and their experts.
Boomgaarden, supra note 85, at 430. See also Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the Practicably
Irrigable Acreage Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURcES
J. 549, 562 (1991).
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tribe is entitled to an award of PIA, or the proposal is not economi-
cally feasible and the tribe receives no water based on the proposed
acreage.8
The PIA standard also has its defenders, if for no other reason
than the fact that "no satisfactory substitute has emerged."88 Once
quantified, PIA is above all things certain, and certainty of water
rights is highly prized in appropriation states. The PIA standard eases
the administration of water rights and the determination of surplus
waters available for use, and encourages economic development de-
pendent upon a stable supply of water.8 9 By providing a definite
quantification standard, PIA also provides a baseline for settlement
negotiations. 90
The future of the PIA standard is not certain. Although the
Supreme Court originally adopted PIA in 1963 as "the only feasible
and fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be mea-
sured,"91 in 1988 the Supreme Court took certiorari on the issue of
whether PIA was the proper measurement of the Wind River Tribes'
water right. 2 Following oral argument, however, an equally divided
87. Franks, supra note 86, at 561-63. For an illustration of the problem, see New Mexico ex
rel Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 235 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming an award to the Mes-
calero Apache Tribe of 23223 acre feet per year, but denying the Tribe's PIA claim to an addi-
tional 15,428 acre feet for two irrigation projects on the ground that neither was irrigable at
reasonable cost), cert. denied, 858 P.2d 85 (N.M. 1993). The PIA standard essentially forced the
Tribe "to proffer what may be fictional irrigation projects" in order to obtain water for the
Tribe's real needs, which are not recognized under an agricultural standard. Franks, supra note
86, at 563. The Mescalero thus ran the "genuine risk of obtaining nothing," leaving tribal needs
for water unfulfilled. Id.
By comparison, in the Big Horn litigation, the court noted that: "It is readily apparent that
the master found economically feasible, or practicably irrigable, all the acres he found to be
irrigable from an engineering standpoint." Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 103. Based in part on
the fact that the master used a high-end-of-the-range 4% discount rate, the Wyoming court up-
held his determination of PIA for the Wimd River Reservation. Id. at 104. In addition, it found
that the master erred in reducing the Tribes' water right by 10% on the ground of inevitable
error. Id. at 105. The court noted that "a margin of error works both ways," and declined to
penalize the Tribes for the uncertainty inherent in the determinations. Id. at 105.
88. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 659.
89. See Boomgaarden, supra note 85, at 427-28. But see Carla J. Bennett, Comment, Quan-
tification of Indian Water Rights: Foresight or Folly?, 8 U.C.L.A. J. ENvT. L. & POL'y 267, 281
(1989) (finding the certainty argument "unpersuasive" since economists are competent to dis-
count for the potential exercise of Indian rights).
90. 4 WATERs, supra note 5, at 230. See also infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
91. Arizona v. California (Arizona 1), 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
92. The question presented by the State of Wyoming's petition for certiorari was as follows:
In absence of any demonstrated necessity for additional water to fulfill reservation pur-
poses and in presence of substantial state water rights long in use on reservation, may
reserved water right be implied for all practicably irrigable lands within reservation set
aside for specific tribe?
Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989), affd, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), reh'g denied, 492
U.S. 938 (1989). The Court did not grant certiorari on other petitions by various parties to the
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court affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court decision awarding water
rights based on PIA.93 Nonetheless, the grant of certiorari indicates
the Court's apparent willingness to revisit the issue of PIA.
Not all reserved water rights are measured by PIA. For example,
rights to water for irrigation that are based on a priority date of time
immemorial are measured not by PIA, but by past use.94 The time
immemorial priority date attaches if the document creating the reser-
vation recognized and affirmed existing aboriginal rights.95  In the
case of aboriginal irrigation, the treaty or agreement would affirm the
amount of water historically used to irrigate, and the reserved right
would thus be quantified based on that past use.
Rights to water based on reservation purposes other than agricul-
ture are also quantified by different measurements than PIA. 96 For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that because one purpose of the Col-
ville Reservation was the preservation of the fisheries, the Colville
Tribes had a right to "the quantity of water necessary to maintain" the
fishery.97 Unlike the PIA measure for agricultural water, there is no
standard for quantifying the instream flow right for fisheries protec-
tion other than the amount of water necessary to preserve the fisher-
ies resource.98
litigation, including the Tribes. Shoshone Tribe v. Wyoming, 492 U.S. 926 (1989). The Tribes'
petition had presented six questions. Question 1 read:
Under Second Treaty of Fort Bridger, pursuant to which Wind River Indian Reserva-
tion was established, is amount of water reserved for Indians to be quantified solely by
reference to irrigation needs of reservation or rather, in light of treaty's express pur-
pose of creating "permanent home" for Indians, by reference to all uses necessary to
develop permanent homeland for Indians on reservation?
Shoshone Thbe v. Wyoming, 57 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 21, 1988).
93. Big Horn I, supra note 31. Justice O'Connor heard oral argument but then recused
herself from taking part in the decision. The remaining justices split evenly.
94. 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 232.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
96. One commentator has proposed a standard of quantification in cases where a court
recognizes the reservation purpose of establishing a permanent homeland. Rusinek, supra note
83, at 407. The court "could require a claimant tribe to present a plan for reservation develop-
ment that would specify prospective uses of the water and estimate the quantity of water needed
to effectuate those purposes. This process alone would force the tribe to establish a comprehen-
sive plan for the development or protection of the reservation's lands before the reserved rights
were quantified." Id
97. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton I), 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See also Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It
Grew: Federal Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639, 661 (positing
that the "amount of water necessary to fulfill the particular purpose for which the water is im-
pliedly reserved" is the appropriate quantification standard for all nonagricultural uses).
98. See Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet Revolution in Federal and
Tribal Minimum Streamflows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 472 (1992) (noting that reserved rights for
fisheries, unlike reserved rights for irrigation, are needs based).
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Moreover, all of these standards for quantifying tribal water
fights are judicially developed measurements, and judicial determina-
tions of Winters fights are increasingly being replaced with settlement
agreements. 99 The central feature of these settlements is the quantifi-
cation of the tribal right to water. While negotiations may proceed on
the basis of PIA, tribes generally agree to a certain amount of water,
usually with promises of assistance in delivering the water to the reser-
vation, in exchange for ceding their claims to potentially larger but
often unspecified amounts of water.10° In virtually all settlements, the
tribes have agreed to less water than they would be entitled to under
their Winters rights.1° 1
E. Use of Reserved Water Rights
Although tribal rights to water are quantified based on the pur-
poses of the reservations, those purposes generally do not define the
uses which tribes can make of the water. In particular, courts have
generally not confined the use of water quantified by PIA to agricul-
tural purposes, but have recognized that tribes may use their PIA-
awarded water rights for other purposes. On the other hand, where
courts have recognized that one purpose of a reservation is fisheries
protection and awarded a non-consumptive instream flow right, tribes
may not change the use of the water to a consumptive purpose.
As noted, most tribes are likely to be awarded a water right based
on an agrarian purpose of their reservation. Those PIA rights,
although quantified on an agricultural basis, are typically not re-
stricted to agricultural use. In Arizona v. California, in conformance
with a stipulation of the parties, the Supreme Court declared that PIA
is "the means of determining quantity of adjudicated water rights but
shall not constitute a restriction of the usage of them to irrigation or
other agricultural application."'" In accordance with the Court's
statement, the Ninth Circuit subsequently held that the tribe may de-
termine how to use its quantity of reserved water.10 3 The court noted
99. See generally 4 WATERs, supra note 5, at 259-63.
100. BURTON, supra note 41, at 80-81; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK; supra note 6, at 598.
101. BURTON, supra note 41, at 80-81. Burton states that this is true of all water settlements
from 1910 to 1989. Id. Tribes may generally be willing to negotiate for less than their legal
Winters rights in exchange for delivery of "wet" water and for concessions on other unsettled
issues such as access to groundwater, right to change of use, and water marketing. On settle-
ments generally, see infra section VI.B.
102. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979), reh'g denied, 462 U.S. 1146 (1983).
103. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton 1), 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981)
("When the Tribe has a vested property right in reserved water, it may use it in any lawful
[Vol. 30:61
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that tribal choice of use is "consistent with" the general homeland
purpose of Indian reservations; as the tribes adapt to changing circum-
stances, their water rights may also be adapted to modem usages."°
Forcing the tribes to use their water for agriculture also forces the
tribes to conform to late nineteenth century views of what was best for
the Indians. 105
Nonetheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court recently ruled in Big
Horn III that tribes have no "unfettered right" to use their PIA-based
water rights for other than agricultural uses."° In that case, the Wind
River Tribes had attempted to devote a portion of their "future" PIA
water right107 to instream flow for fisheries, recreational, and other
purposes. The court refused to allow the change in use for future
water, even though it appears that a majority of the justices would
reach the opposite result as to existing water.
Justice Macy, who delivered the opinion of the court,0 8 believed
that the instream flow issue was foreclosed by the court's decision in
Big Horn L He found that the court's prior ruling on the agricultural-
manner. As a result, subsequent acts making the historically intended use of the water unneces-
sary do not divest the Tribe of the right to the water."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
104. Id. at 49 (noting that a homeland implies "the survival and growth of the Indians and
their way of life.").
105. See Sondheim & Alexander, supra note 30, at 9 (arguing that if the only use of water
contemplated was agricultural, then tribes should lose the water if it is used for any other pur-
pose). Cf. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
(Big Horn 11), 835 P.2d 273,288 (Wyo. 1992) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The effect
of the majority determination is to make marginal farmers out of the Tribes forever. This defeats
the purposes for which the Reservation was created.").
106. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 278 (Macy, J., delivering the opinion of the court). Pre-
sumably, however, the tribes do have a right to use their PIA-based water for any of the uses
which the court found "subsumed" within agriculture: livestock watering and municipal, domes-
tic, and commercial use. See supra text accompanying note 74.
For more detailed criticism of this aspect of the case, see Wes Williams, Jr., Changing Water
Use for Federally Reserved Indian Water Rights: Wind River Indian Reservation, 27 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 501 (1994); Berrie Martinis, Note, From Quantification to Qualification: A State Court's
Distortion of the Law in In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 68 WASH. L. Rav. 435 (1993); Peggy Sue Kirk, Note, Water Law-Indian Law-
Cowboys, Indians, and Reserved Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use
Their Water?, 28 LAND & WATER L. REv. 467 (1993). See also Gover, Stetson & Williams, In re:
The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other
Sources in the State of Wyoming, 46 ARK. L. REv. 237 (1993) (reprinting the tribes' petition for
rehearing of the Big Horn III decision).
107. The decision technically addressed only the tribes' "future water", that is, the PIA-
based water right awarded for future irrigation projects on lands not yet developed for agricul-
ture. See Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 101. As Justice Cardine noted, however, the court's rationale
would seem to apply to existing water rights as well as to future water rights. Big Horn II, 835
P.2d at 285 (Cardine, J., concurring and dissenting).
108. The Big Horn III decision is remarkable for the fact that the five-justice Wyoming
Supreme Court delivered five separate opinions. Although Justice Macy was able to garner a 3-2
majority on each issue, no other justice actually joined fully in his opinion.
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only purpose of the Wind River Reservation'0 9 was determinative of
the uses to which the water could be put. "If we had intended to spec-
ify what the water could be used for merely as a methodology to de-
termine the amount of water the Tribes could use for any purpose, we
would have said so."110 If the tribes wanted to change the use, Macy
said, they were required to comply with Wyoming state law. And
since Wyoming law permits only the state itself to hold an instream
flow right, the tribes would be prevented from using their Winters
rights for that purpose."' Justice Thomas agreed that the tribes could
not change their use to an instream flow, but based his opinion solely
on his belief that the tribes' water rights were subject to state regula-
tion. Accordingly, Thomas believed that the tribes could put their
water to an instream use only if that were permitted under Wyoming
law, which it was not." 2 Both Justices Macy and Thomas thus ignored
the fact that Winters rights are federal rights, defined and controlled
by federal rather than state law. 13
Justice Cardine, who gave Justice Macy his 3-2 victory on the
change of use issue, wrote an idiosyncratic and opaque opinion in
which he argued that "future" water could not be put to an instream
flow use unless it were first put to the use for which it was awarded:
that is, irrigation. 1 4 However, Cardine also would hold that the tribes
109. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
110. Big Horn 11I, 835 P.2d at 278. To support this contention, Justice Macy cited passages
from Big Horn I restricting the purpose of the reservation to agriculture and therefore restricting
the measure of the water right to the agricultural standard of PIA. Id. at 277-78. At no time,
however, did the court in Big Horn I make any ruling concerning the uses to which that amount
of water could be put.
111. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 288. Like Wyoming, most western states that recognize in-
stream flows prefer to maintain state control over the use of water instream. See Blumm, supra
note 98, at 447-48. State control is often justified by the notion that instream flows prejudice
appropriators. Tribal instream flows, however, would not appear to do so. Upstream junior
appropriators must deliver to the reservation the amount of water to which the tribe is entitled,
regardless of the use to which the tribe puts that water. In addition, a change from irrigation to
the non-consumptive instream flow right would, at least theoretically, benefit downstream junior
appropriators since it would make more water available below the reservation.
112. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 284 (Thomas, J., concurring).
113. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410-11 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1983) (expressly
noting that the tribe was entitled to an instream flow for fisheries protection even though state
law did not recognize an instream flow right, because Indian reserved rights are "defined by
federal, not state, law"), cerL denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). One commentator who criticized thejustices' incorporation of state law nonetheless proposed an alternative that would subject tribal
water rights to state law as well. Williams, supra note 106, at 529-31 (proposing that tribes be
able to put their water to any "beneficial" use, but defining beneficial use according to state law,
and apparently awarding to the state any tribal water not applied to state-defined beneficial
uses).
114. Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 285-86 (Cardine, J., concurring and dissenting). This approach
is particularly odd, since it would require the tribes to develop irrigation projects, undoubtedly at
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"are free to promulgate their own standards for instream flow rights
and for change of use" for PIA-based water rights presently in use for
irrigation." 5 Since the remaining two justices argued that the tribes
had the right to a change of use even for future water,1 6 the practical
outcome of the case is bizarre. The court held 3-2 that the tribes may
not put their future PIA rights to an instream use. But three justices
plainly supported the proposition, not before the court, that the tribes
can put their existing PIA-based water to an instream use." 7 And it
would appear that if the tribes put their future water to actual use in
irrigation, the decision is then 3-2 that they have the right at that point
to change the use of the water to an instream flow.
The Wyoming litigation involved a tribal attempt to change the
use of water awarded for the consumptive purpose of irrigation to the
non-consumptive use of instream flow. While most courts would find
that change of use within the tribe's authority to determine, the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that tribes may not make the opposite change in
use."" Where tribes have been awarded a quantity of water to fulfill
the purpose of fisheries preservation, that water right is an instream
flow right, 1 9 and the court held that tribes may not change their in-
stream flow rights to consumptive uses. The court noted that the right
to an instream flow is more in the nature of a right to prevent others
from drawing the stream down below a certain level than a right to
use the water.' 20 Moreover, changing the instream flow right to a con-
sumptive use would return less water to downstream appropriators,
adversely impacting state-law diverters below the reservation.
As with other unsettled areas of tribal water rights, the right to
change of use, and in particular the right to use water for instream
flows for fisheries, wildlife, recreation, and tourism, can be addressed
in settlement negotiations. Some Indian water settlements have re-
solved the issue by specifying that the tribes may use their water rights
great cost, simply in order to then transfer the water right to an instream or other non-agricul-
tural (or subsumed) use.
115. Id. at 285.
116. Id. at 288-90 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) and 292-94 (Golden, J., dissenting).
117. This was Justice Cardine's point. The two justices who supported the tribes' right to
change of use for future water would certainly support the same right for existing water. There-
fore, if and when the issue of change of use for existing water reaches the Wyoming court, the
decision would be 3-2 in favor of the tribes.
118. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410-11 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1252 (1984).
119. See generally Blumm, supra note 98 (discussing rights to instream flows).
120. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411.
1994]
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for any purpose or for specified purposes other than agricultural pur-
poses, such as instream flows. 1
21
F. Water Transfers and Water Marketing
One aspect of Winters rights related to tribal use of the water is
that of water transfers and water marketing.122 The tribes' ability to
transfer their Winters rights to non-Indian lessees within the reserva-
tion'l or to market their water rights outside the reservation may be
crucial to tribal economic development.124
Both types of transfers may require the consent of Congress.
Under the Nonintercourse Act, tribal property may not be alienated
or encumbered without congressional authorization,12- and that re-
striction likely extends to tribal water rights. 26 Tribes may thus lease
or market their water with congressional consent. While Congress has
given general consent to on-reservation transfers of tribal water rights
to lessees of Indian lands, there is some uncertainty concerning off-
reservation transfers.
Leasing of Indian lands is, as a practical matter, dependent upon
the appurtenant water rights. Certainly agricultural leases of trust
lands would be virtually useless without water, but other types of lease
activities require water as well. Accordingly, Congress has authorized
121. For discussions of settlements that include instream flow rights, see 4 WATERS, supra
note 5, at 261-62; Blumm, supra note 98, at 475-76.
122. The concepts of water marketing and the use to which water may be put, while often
linked, are conceptually distinct. Certainly the prevailing view that the use of water is not de-
pendent upon the purposes for which the water is reserved, see supra text accompanying notes
102-105, eases the water marketing concept. If PIA rights may be used for any purpose, and if
PIA rights may be marketed, then the water should be subject to marketing for any purpose.
And that flexibility, in turn, should increase the marketability and the value of the rights. But
even in the unlikely event that the Big Horn III argument prevails - that the use of Winters
rights is restricted to the purposes for which the water is reserved; see supra text accompanying
notes 106-110--marketability remains viable. If the water right is marketable, then the tribe
could, for example, market its agricultural water for agricultural or subsumed purposes. That
approach would limit the uses for which the water could be marketed, but it would not affect the
determination of marketability itself.
123. The transfer of water rights to non-Indians who acquire lands within reservation bound-
aries is discussed infra in section IV.
124. For some tribes, the "only resource of any real value" may be the Winters rights to
water. Bill Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MoNT. L. REv. 266, 276 (1972).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988). The Nonintercourse Act was first enacted in 1790.
126. See Steven J. Shupe, Indian Tribes in the Water Marketing Arena, 15 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 185, 197 (1990) (water rights are included because "resources associated with land" are
encompassed within the meaning of "land" in the Nonintercourse Act); Richard B. Collins, The
Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. CoLo. L. REv. 481, 489 (1985) (water rights are
included because they are property rights).
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the Secretary of the Interior, in leasing Indian lands, to lease the water
rights appurtenant to those lands. 27
Off-reservation marketing of tribal water rights is potentially
even more valuable than on-reservation leasing. Once tribal water
rights are quantified, tribes are often not able to put the water to im-
mediate use. Water projects and delivery systems are seldom in place
and are prohibitively expensive for most tribes to construct without
federal financial assistance.128 Off-reservation marketing of the water
can provide the tribes with a prompt economic return from their water
rights, 129 while also providing the off-reservation non-Indian water
users with needed water. Opponents of tribal water marketing gener-
ally argue that it will decrease water available to state users or make
the water too expensive,'3 0 but in the absence of water marketing
state appropriators have free use of a valuable tribal resource. 3 '
With mechanisms available to ameliorate the impact on junior state
diverters,'132 water marketing can prove a profitable economic devel-
opment measure for tribes.
127. See Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921). General surface leasing au-
thority is found at 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1988), which provides that lands can be leased for "public,
religious, educational, recreational, residential, or business" purposes and that natural resources
can be developed or used in connection with the leases. See also the agricultural leasing statutes:
25 U.S.C. § 402a (1988) (leasing of unallotted irrigable lands); § 394 (1988) (leasing of allotted
lands that are "arid but susceptible of irrigation"); § 393 (1988) (leasing of restricted allotments);
and § 393a (1988) (leases of restricted lands of the Five Civilized Tribes). These authorized
leases for farming purposes would be all but useless without water for irrigation.
128. Shupe, supra note 126, at 197.
129. The economic benefits from off-reservation water marketing are not confined to the
lease revenues. Water marketing would also "generate jobs, increase services, and stimulate the
economic growth of the reservation as a whole." Lee H. Storey, Comment, Leasing Indian
Water Off the Reservation: A Use Consistent with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAL- L. REv. 179,
217 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Jack D. Palma II, Considerations and Conclusions Concerning the Transferabil-
ity of Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 91, 95-96 (1980); Belinda K. Orem, Comment,
Paleface, Redskin, and the Great White Chiefs in Washington: Drawing the Battle Lines Over
Western Water Rights, 17 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 449, 469 (1980).
131. See David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to
Pragmatism, 58 U. CoLo. L. REv. 515,545 (1988) (noting that tribal senior rights will have "little
practical effect" on state appropriators so long as the tribal rights go unused).
132. Most common is the suggestion that off-reservation marketing be permitted only if jun-
ior state appropriators are not injured. See, e.g., Storey, supra note 129, at 212. That importation
of the state no-injury rule, however, has been attacked as restricting tribes' ability to make full
use of their Winters rights. Susan Williams, Indian Winters Water Rights Administration: Averting
New War, 11 PUB. LAND L. REv. 53, 74 (1990). Other commentators have offered additional
ways to protect junior state appropriators. One has suggested that if the state's interests are
disadvantaged by the highest bidder for Indian water rights, then the state could buy the rights
and make them available to state users in accord with state policy. Christine Lichtenfels, Com-
ment, Indian Reserved Water Rights: An Argument for the Right to Export and Sell, 24 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 131, 144 (1989). Another has suggested federal compensation for junior users
injured by tribal water marketing. Karen M. Schapiro, An Argument for the Marketability of
23
Royster: A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:61
Nonetheless, legal authority for water marketing is uncertain.
Congress has not given express general consent to off-reservation
leasing of water rights,133 and based on that lack of express consent,
the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the Wind River Tribes had no
right to market their water.' 34 The Department of the Interior, how-
ever, has recently proposed draft rules that recognize an existing right
to market water for those tribes with rights to water in the lower basin
of the Colorado River.'3 5 Relying on the general leasing statute,3 6
additional statutes granting the Department broad authority to man-
age Indian affairs and trust resources, 37 and the law of the Colorado
River,13 8 the Department asserted the right to water marketing for the
lower Colorado basin tribes without further authorization from Con-
gress. The Department's conclusions, however, were limited to the
lower Colorado River basin and were not necessarily applicable to all
tribes with rights to water. 39
In addition to the Department's position that Congress has con-
sented to the marketing of tribal rights in the waters of the lower Col-
orado River, Congress itself has expressly consented to water
marketing by particular tribes. A number of Indian water settlement
Indian Reserved Water Rights: Tapping the Untapped Reservoir, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 277, 291
(1987).
133. Shupe, supra note 126, at 198. One commentator has suggested that tribes might avoid
the Nonintercourse Act by agreeing to forego the use of their water rights in exchange for pay-
ment. Schapiro, supra note 132, at 290 n.68; but see Getches, supra note 131, at 546 (noting that
deferral agreements have "many attributes of a lease"). Deferral agreements can be valuable to
tribes. For example, the Wind River Tribes agreed to forego their newly-adjudicated water
rights for 1989 in exchange for state payments of 5.5 million dollars. Robert H. Abrams, The Big
Horn Indian Water Rights Adjudication: A Battle for the Legal Imagination, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 71,
74 (1990).
134. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 100.
135. Regulations for Administering Entitlements to Colorado River Water in the Lower Colo-
rado River Basin at 8-19 (May 6, 1994 draft regulations) [hereinafter Draft Regulations]. The
Department stated that "it is the Department's preliminary conclusion that in the context of the
Lower Basin it is permissible, without additional authority from Congress, to allow for the use of
Indian reserved right water off the reservations." Id. at 11. As of September 30, 1994, the draft
regulations had not yet been issued as a proposed rule.
136. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1988); see supra note 127.
137. The Department referenced 25 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 9. Draft Regulations, supra note 135, at
13-14.
138. In particular, the Department relied on the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928 and its
interpretation by the Supreme Court in Arizona I. Draft Regulations, supra note 135, at 14-16.
The Department noted that the Act, as interpreted by the Court, granted the Department full
power to manage and control the waters of the lower basin of the Colorado River. Id. at 16.
Given that the ability to market Indian water rights "will add much-needed flexibility to the
system," the Department concluded that its authority under the law of the Colorado River "au-
thorized inclusion of Indian water rights" in the leasing and water marketing provisions. Id.
139. Id, at 10 (noting that the conclusions are "within the context of the law of the Colorado
River").
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acts have included provisions for water leasing and water market-
ing.140 Many of these settlement acts consent to off-reservation leas-
ing, although generally not to the permanent alienation of tribal rights
to water.
14 1
G. Water Quality
The Winters right to water has generally been litigated as a right
to a quantity of water, leaving unresolved the question of whether the
doctrine also encompasses a right to water quality.'42 Where water of
adequate quality is necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the res-
ervation was set aside, however, the Winters doctrine would seem to
dictate that the tribal water right includes a right to quality as well as
quantity. 43 Both irrigation and fisheries protection require water of
adequate quality for the intended uses.'" Certainly if domestic uses
140. See 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 261-62 (1991) and 35-36 (1993 Supp.) for sample settle-
ments. For discussions of particular acts, see Nancy K. Laney, Note, Transferability Under the
Papago Water Rights Settlement, 26 AR!z. L. REv. 421 (1984); Shupe, supra note 126, at 199-202
(discussing the San Luis Rey and Colorado Ute water rights settlement acts).
141. See, eg., the Papago (Tohono O'odham Nation) water rights settlement act. Laney,
supra note 140, at 424.
142. Tribal water quality concerns are more commonly addressed under the federal environ-
mental statutes, which generally permit tribes to seek program authorization for the environ-
mental programs mandated under the acts. The Clean Water Act, for example, provides that
tribes may seek program authorization for implementing the permit programs for dredge and fill
materials and discharges from point sources; promulgating water quality standards; developing
management programs for non-point source pollution; seeking certain types of grants; and grant-
ing or denying certification for federally permitted activities that may result in discharges of
pollutants into the waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988). Under the Act, tribes may seek authori-
zation to impose stringent water quality standards for such purposes as traditional religious use
of waters. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, No. 93-82 (D.N.M. 1993) (upholding the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's approval of extremely stringent Isleta Pueblo WQS for the seg-
ment of the Rio Grande running through the Pueblo). Similarly, under the Safe Drinking Water
Act, tribes may seek to assume primary enforcement responsibility for the public water systems
program (enforcing drinking water standards) and the underground injection control programs,
42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (1988), and the Environmental Protection Agency has proposed rules that
would authorize tribes to seek funding for sole source aquifer and wellhead protection programs.
See 52 Fed. Reg. 46,712 (1987); see also Judith Royster, Approaches to Groundwater Protection
in Indian Country in Sovereignty Symposium VII (1994). On the issues of tribal control over
environmental protection under the federal acts, see generally Judith V. Royster & Rory
SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment Tribal Primacy, Federal Delega-
tion, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581 (1989). Despite the apparently
comprehensive nature of the federal statutes, however, the programs are not available to all
tribes and do not cover all water resources. Accordingly, a right to water quality under the
Winters doctrine would provide tribes with an additional and important means of ensuring clean
water resources in Indian country.
143. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 587; 4 WATERs, supra note 5, at 220; Mar-
garet S. Treuer, An Indian Right to Water Undiminished in Quality, 7 HAMUNE L. REv. 347
(1984).
144. See Treuer, supra note 143, at 366. On a related issue, one district court held that the
Spokane Tribe had a right to a sufficient quantity of water to keep the water temperature at 68' F
or less because a higher temperature would endanger the native fish population. United States
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such as water for drinking and cooking are subsumed within the Win-
ters PIA right,145 water quality becomes an even more vital concern.
Although no court has yet directly addressed a Winters right to
water quality, one recent decision determined that non-Indian irriga-
tion return flows high in salt content did not satisfy the downstream
San Carlos Apache Tribe's right to the "natural flow" of the river.146
Although the district court noted that water quality issues would be
deferred to later phase of the litigation, it nonetheless enjoined up-
stream non-Indian users from diverting the entire flow of the river for
irrigation, leaving only saline return flow for the downstream Apache
Tribe.147, On appeal, however, the circuit court held that injunction to
be an abuse of discretion.148 Because the water quality issues had
been postponed by stipulation, the appeals court noted, the upstream
diverters were not allowed to present evidence concerning the quality
of the irrigation return flows.149 Accordingly, the appeals court va-
cated the injunction and left the water quality issues for a later pro-
ceeding at which all parties could present their evidence.1 50
IV. WATER RIGHTS OF ALLOTrEES & NON-INDIANS
The question of water rights for allottees and non-Indians owning
land within Indian country has its origins in the ill-fated allotment era
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1887, the fed-
eral government instituted a fundamental shift in federal Indian pol-
v. Anderson, 6 INDIAN L REP. F-129, F-130 (E.D. Wash. 1979). That reasoning should permit a
tribe to prevent or enjoin thermal pollution of water where water of a certain temperature is
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.
145. See Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 99.
146. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 804 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D. Ariz. 1992), affd in
part and vacated in part, No. 93-15076, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 17033 (9th Cir. July 13,1994). The
"natural flow" right was based on the 1935 Globe Equity Consent Decree, which provided that
the United States owned, on behalf of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, the right to divert 6000 acre
feet of the Gila River during the irrigation season "from the natural flow in said river." See id. at
5. The court subsequently noted, however, that the decree "codifies their right to the 'natural
flow' of the river," id. at 7, indicating perhaps that a natural flow right is inherent in tribal water
rights. In any case, the court held that the Tribe had a prior right as against the upstream
diverters to the natural flow of the river. Id.
147. Ld. The court ordered that the Tribe's full right to 6000 acre feet must pass undiverted
so long as the Tribe asserted its rights to the water. If the Tribe did not exercise its rights, the
upstream users were entitled to divert the water and send the irrigation return flow downstream.
148. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation District, No. 93-15076, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
17033, at *48 (9th Cir. July 13, 1994).
149. Id. at *4546.
150. Id. at *48-49. The water quality phase of the litigation is scheduled for November 1994.
Id. at "40.
[Vol. 30:61
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icy. With passage of the General Allotment Act,' 51 Congress pursued
the allotment of tribal lands and the assimilation of Indians into white
society. Allotments were designed to break up the reservations into
private ownership, in the belief that individual property would turn
the Indians from a tribal life to agriculture, Christianity, and citizen-
ship. 5 ' To that end, the Act allotted to individual Indians a certain
number of acres, to be held in trust for the individual for 25 years and
then patented in fee. 53 Lands remaining after the allotment process
were declared "surplus" lands and could be opened to non-Indian
settlement. 154
Prior to 1934, when Congress formally ended allotment and in-
definitely extended the trust status of existing allotments, 55 millions
of acres of reservation lands were lost to tribal ownership. In all,
tribes lost approximately 90 million acres of trust lands between 1887
and 1934.156 Some 60 million were "surplus" lands opened for home-
steading. An additional 27 million acres, some two-thirds of the lands
allotted to Indians, passed into non-Indian ownership by voluntary
151. Ch. 119, 4 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1988)). Several
tribes in Oklahoma, including the Five Tribes, were exempt from the General Allotment Act,
although Congress subsequently enacted special allotment acts. See, e.g., Cherokee Allotment
Act, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716 (1902). For tribes in eastern Oklahoma, the former Indian Territory,
allotments were restricted (that is, the allottee held the fee subject to a restriction against aliena-
tion) rather than trust allotments. However, there is little if any legal difference between the two
types of allotted lands.
On the General Allotment Act and its effects, see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allot-
ment, 27 ARmZ. ST. L.J. 1 (forthcoming 1995); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Movement to Assimi-
late the American Indians: A Jurisprudential Study, 57 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 399 (1989); FREDERICK
E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920 (1984);
JANET A. MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1887-1934 (1991).
152. See 2 PRUCHA, supra note 16, at 661 (citing Senator Richard Coke, chairman of the
Committee on Indian Affairs). In that regard, the goals of the allotment policy were similar to
the goals of the reservation policy: both were designed to turn the Indians into yeoman farmers.
The reservation-era policy of a "measured separatism," however, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 16 (1987), was replaced with the allotment-era policy
of assimilation.
153. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5,24 Stat. 388,389 (1887) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 331 (1988)). The precise size of allotments varied over time, although most allotments
consisted of 80 or 160 acres. Eventually, allotments of agricultural land were 80 acres, while
allotments of grazing land were 160 acres. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 17, 36 Stat. 859
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)).
154. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (1887).
155. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 provided that trust allotments would continue in
trust until Congress provided otherwise. Act of June 18, 1934 , ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988)). Tribes in Oklahoma were exempted from the IRA, 25
U.S.C. § 473 (1988), although the provisions of the IRA were subsequently extended to them in
the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936, see 25 U.S.C. § 503 (1988). Today, an allottee can
petition the Secretary of the Interior to remove the trust restrictions and issue a fee patent. See
25 C.F.R. §§ 152.4-5 (1993).
156. COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 138.
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sale, fraud, and sheriffs' sales once patents in fee were issued to allot-
tees. Millions of acres more remained in trust allotments, with ap-
proximately 9 million acres still held in trust for individuals today.157
The water rights issue for these lands is whether the owners are enti-
tled to exercise some portion of the tribal Winters right to water, and if
so to what extent.
A. Allotment Water Rights
Indian allottees hold Winters rights to water reserved for agricul-
tural purposes. The principle has its origins in United States v. Pow-
ers,'58 in which the Supreme Court refused to enjoin water use on
former allotments. 159 The Court found that water rights for allotted
lands were consistent with the purpose behind the allotment policy:
water was necessary to cultivation of the lands, and cultivation was the
purpose of allotment.6 Subsequently, the lower courts read Powers
to grant allottees a "just share" of the tribe's water rights,' 61 and even-
tually the allottee's share was quantified as a ratable share of the
tribe's PIA rights, based on the amount of irrigable acres in the allot-
ment.' 62 Because the allottees' rights are tied to the agrarian purposes
of the allotment policy, allottees have no rights to tribal water re-
served for other than irrigation purposes. Thus, a share of tribal re-
served rights to water for purposes other than agriculture, such as
water for instream flows to maintain fisheries, does not pass to allot-
tees but remains with the tribes. 63
157. Trust allotments represent almost one-fifth of the approximately 53 million acres cur-
rently held in trust. MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 145 (1990).
158. 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
159. Id. The lands in question were, in 1939, held in fee, apparently by non-Indians. Id. at
531; see also United States v. Powers, 16 F. Supp. 155, 164 (D. Mont. 1936) (the district court
case).
160. Powers, 305 U.S. at 533.
161. Segundo v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 554, 558 (S.D. Cal. 1954); see also Scholder v.
United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970). But see
David H. Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D. L. REv. 405, 416-19 (1981) (argu-
ing that water rights for allotments are not rights vested in the allottee, but tribal rights which
the allottee is entitled to use).
162. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton 1), 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton 11), 752 F.2d 397,
401 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Montana ex rel Greely v. Confederated
Salish Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985).
163. Walton II, 752 F.2d at 400.
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Allottees' water rights, because they derive from tribal rights,164
are governed by the same principles. Thus, the priority date for allot-
tees is the date the reservation was created, 65 and allottees' rights are
not lost through non-use. 166 The same rights apply to Indian fee lands
which have never passed out of Indian ownership. 67
B. Water Rights of Non-Indians
Non-Indians can acquire reservation lands in one of two ways.
Non-Indians may have purchased allotments from allottees who re-
ceived fee patents to their land, or they may have homesteaded "sur-
plus" reservation lands opened to settlement after the reservations
were allotted. The extent of water rights available to the non-Indian
owners depends upon how the fee lands were acquired.
Where the non-Indian fee land was formerly an allotment, the
non-Indian owner succeeds to the allottees' water rights'6 on the
ground that the water is necessary to make the land marketable. 69
The non-Indian acquires the priority date of the allottee: that is, the
date the Indian reservation was created.170 However, the non-Indian
164. This assumes that the allotment was created from reservation lands. Some allotments
were acquired from the public domain or by purchase. Professor Collins argues that these allot-
ments, as Indian country, should be accorded reserved water rights subject to the same rules as
tribal reserved rights. Richard B. Collins, Indian Allotment Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L.
Rav. 421, 437 (1985).
165. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51; Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1469 (10th Cir. 1994).
166. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51; Walton 11, 752 F.2d at 404; Greely, 712 P.2d at 764.
167. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 112. The Indian fee lands at issue were allotments on
which the trust period had expired and the Indian owners had received fee patents. Some com-
mentators have argued that Indian patentees should not- succeed to the full share of the tribe's
Winters rights, but rather should have a right to the quantity of water actually put to use at the
time of the patent. Getches, supra note 161, at 422; Robert Isham, Jr., Note, Colville Confeder-
ated Tribes v. Walton: Indian Water Rights and Regulation in the Ninth Circuit, 43 MoNT. L. REv.
247, 262 (1982). Isham further suggests that the patentee's priority date should be the date of
the first continuous appropriation, not the date of creation of the reservation.
168. See United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527,533 (1939); United States v. Ahtanum Irriga-
tion Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 342 (9th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957). This rule has been
roundly criticized. Commentators note that water was reserved to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation and that permitting the water to pass to non-Indians does nothing to fulfill those
purposes. See Philip W. Dufford, Water for Non-Indians on the Reservation: Checkerboard Own-
ership and Checkerboard Jurisdiction, 15 GONz. L. REv. 95,112-16 (1979) (referring to the prac-
tice as "giv[ing] the henhouse to the fox"); John F. Araas, Note, Indian Law-Water Law-
Transferability of Reserved Rights from the Indian Allottee to the Non-Indian Purchaser, 17 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 155, 161 (1982); Matthew L. Fick, Note, Water Rights on Indian Reserva-
tions-Transferability of Indian Water Rights-State Administration of Non-Indian Water Rights
Within the Reservation, 58 WASH. L. REv. 89, 96 (1982).
169. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51. See also Getches, supra note 161, at 423; Frank M. Bond, Note,
Indian Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Expanded, 23 NAT. REsOURCES J. 205, 212 (1983).
170. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410-11 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1252 (1984); Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51; Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 113.
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fee owner does not automatically acquire the full measure of the allot-
tee's PIA right. Instead, the non-Indian acquires a right to the quan-
tity of water being used at the time title passes, plus the amount of
water which the non-Indian can put to a beneficial use within a rea-
sonable time after the purchase, up to a maximum amount equal to
the allottee's ratable share of the tribe's Winters right.171 Non-Indian
purchasers can lose Winters rights through non-use because the pur-
pose of the water rights - to make the land productive farming land
for the Indians - no longer exists when the land is sold to a non-
Indian. 72
I Non-Indian lands acquired by homesteading, by contrast, do not
include Winters rights, for two reasons. 173 First, homesteaders gener-
ally do not acquire water rights incident to the acquisition of public
domain lands. 74 Second, the purpose of Winters rights, to make the
land productive for Indians, disappears when the land has been re-
turned to the public domain. 75 This analysis, however, would only
seem to apply if the surplus lands were in fact disestablished from the
reservation and returned to the public domain before being opened
for homesteading. Not all surplus lands acts returned the surplus
lands to the public domain. Many simply opened portions of the res-
ervations to homesteading without terminating the land as reservation
territory. 76 Because some surplus lands were neither returned to the
public domain nor disestablished from the reservations, it is not clear
that Winters rights were terminated when those lands were
homesteaded.177
171. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984); Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417;
Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51; Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 113-14; United States ex rel. Ray v. Hibner, 27
F.2d 909, 912 (E.D. Idaho 1928). Some commentators have argued that only the water right in
use by the Indian owner should carry the tribe's priority date; "unused" water put to use by the
non-Indian owner should have a priority date of the first continuous appropriation. Getches,
supra note 161, at 426; Fick, supra note 168, at 99.
172. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 51; Hibner, 27 F.2d at 912.
173. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362-63.
174. Id.; California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
175. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
176. Compare Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 475 (1984), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 948 (1984)
(Cheyenne River surplus lands act did not disestablish the reservation, but merely opened reser-
vation lands to non-Indian settlers) with Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 970-71 (1994), reh'g
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1580 (1994) (Uintah surplus land acts disestablished portion of the reservation
and returned the lands to the public domain). See Royster, supra note 151.
177. See Dufford, supra note 168, at 118-19 (positing that awarding homesteaders of on-
reservation lands a portion of the tribe's Winters rights could be viewed as consistent with the
purposes of the reservation).
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C. Water Rights of Reacquired Lands
Tribal reacquisition of reservation lands can take three forms: re-
acquisition of lands owned by Indians whether in trust or in fee; reac-
quisition of former allotments owned by non-Indians; and
reacquisition of surplus lands.
Since allotments or former allotments owned by Indians retain
their full Winters rights, those rights would pass back to the tribe upon
reacquisition of the land. Where a tribe reacquires a former allotment
owned by a non-Indian, the tribe basically succeeds to the non-In-
dian's rights." 8 That is, the tribe reacquires water fights with the orig-
inal priority date of the creation of the reservation.179 The measure of
the reacquired Winters rights, however, is apparently not the full PIA
amount, but only those rights which the non-Indian owner had not
lost through non-use. 80
Non-Indian lands acquired under the surplus lands act (at least
those homesteaded from tribal lands returned to the public domain)
do not carry Winters rights, and thus there are no water fights for the
tribe to reacquire.' 8' The tribe will, however, generally succeed to the
state law water rights of the non-Indian owner.'82 If the property does
not include perfected water rights, either because the homesteader did
not appropriate water or because the land was never homesteaded,
then the land is essentially treated as a new reservation. The tribe will
be entitled to Winters rights on the land in order to carry out the pur-
poses of reserving the reacquired lands.183 Winters rights on reac-
quired homesteaded land, however, have a priority date as of the date
178. One commentator has noted that this reasoning essentially leaves the tribes without
Winters rights on reacquired lands. Instead, the tribe receives "an appropriative water right
dependent upon the diligence and efforts of non-Indian transferees." Marte Lightstone, Note,
Indian Water Law: The Continuing Jurisdictional Nightmare, 25 NAT. REsOuRCEs . 841, 847
(1985). Professor Getches has argued that allotments returned to tribal trust status should carry
the same water rights that the land had before it was allotted, despite the potential impact on
state appropriators. Getches, supra note 161, at 428-29.
179. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 114.
180. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984). Other courts have not
indicated this restriction on the tribe's reacquired rights. See Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 114 ("Be-
cause all the reacquired lands on the ceded portion of the reservation are reservation lands, the
same as lands on the diminished portion, the same reserved water rights apply.").
181. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1363.
182. Id.
183. Id. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether any state-law appropriation rights
will bar new Winters rights, or whether the state-law rights must be adequate to fulfill the pur-
poses of the reservation. The latter is the preferable interpretation, since inadequate water does
not meet the purposes of reacquiring the land in trust status.
1994]
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of reacquisition, not the date the reservation was originally created,' 84
and consequently may be worthless on over-appropriated streams.18 5
V. ADMINISTRATION OF WATER RIGHTS
Water rights and water use within Indian country must be admin-
istered in order to assure proper access to and distribution of the
water. While the federal government could either administer water
rights or delegate the authority to do so, federal regulation of reserved
rights to water has been minimal.18 6 The possible regulators are thus
the tribes and the states, which often assert conflicting authority over
the administration of Indian country water rights. Tribal authority
should generally be exclusive over Indian reserved rights and possibly
over non-Indian water use as well. Tribal ability to regulate water use
in Indian country, however, is complicated by an almost 20-year mora-
torium on Interior Department approval of tribal water codes.'8 7 For
those tribes that require secretarial approval of their laws,1'1 the mor-
atorium instituted in 1975 presents a serious roadblock. Nonetheless,
many tribes have sought exceptions to the moratorium and approval
of their water codes, while other tribes are exempt from the approval
requirement or have chosen to attempt regulation without code
approval.18 9
A. Administration of Indian Reserved Rights
The administration of Winters rights to water within Indian coun-
try involves the regulation of property rights held by tribes and indi-
vidual Indians. Tribal authority to regulate Indian property interests
within reservations is exclusive of the states. 9° Tribes are sovereign
184. Id.
185. Lightstone, supra note 178, at 848.
186. See 4 WATE s, supra note 5, at 269.
187. In 1975, the Secretary of the Interior mandated automatic disapproval of any tribal law
that "purports to regulate the use of water on Indian reservations." See Steven J. Shupe, Water
in Indian Country: From Paper Rights to a Managed Resource, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 561, 579-81
(1986) (discussing the moratorium and Interior Department efforts to promulgate rules for tribal
water codes). See also Getches, supra note 131, at 527-28; 4 WATERs, supra note 5, at 266-67.
188. The constitutions of most tribal governments organized under the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1934, see 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988), require that tribal laws and constitutional amend-
ments be approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Tribes whose governments are not
constituted under the IRA, however, do not need secretarial approval. Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985). Moreover, IRA tribes are theoretically free to
amend their IRA constitutions to delete the requirement of secretarial approval. Id. at 199.
189. See generally Shupe, supra note 187, at 581-88.
190. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 445 (Stevens, J.) and 460 (Blackmun,
J. concurring) (1989) (tribes have exclusive authority to zone trust lands); Montana v. United
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governments, with authority over their people and their territories,'91
retaining the right "to make their own laws and be ruled by them."'
Consequently, tribes should have full and exclusive regulatory author-
ity over Indian reserved rights to water, including water rights of allot-
tees and lessees, subject only to any overriding federal regulation.193
States are permitted to regulate Indians and Indian property in-
side Indian country only in "exceptional circumstances."' 194 The
Supreme Court has confined those circumstances to two situations:
liquor regulation and conservation of species.'95 While no court has
held that a state may directly regulate reserved rights to water, the
Wyoming Supreme Court recently determined that the State Engineer
was authorized to monitor all water rights on the Wind River Reser-
vation.' 96 The court explicitly noted, however, that the engineer was
not empowered to regulate reserved rights under state law, but rather
to enforce reserved rights as determined by federal law. 97 The engi-
neer's authority extended to state appropriators in order to protect
the tribes' Winters rights. 198 In the event the engineer believed the
tribes were in violation of their water rights, the court specified that
the engineer had no authority to take action against the tribes, but was
required to seek enforcement in the Wyoming courts.199
B. Administration of Non-Reserved Rights
Regulation of non-Indian use of "excess" waters on non-Indian
lands within reservations is a more complicated issue.2c° As a rule,
tribes may regulate non-Indians on fee lands where the non-Indian
States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981) (tribes have exclusive authority to regulate hunting and fishing
on trust lands).
191. Thbes possess "attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,557 (1975); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi-
ans, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
192. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tbe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983).
193. Coi-nN's HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 604.
194. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215.
195. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (liquor); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dep't of
Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (preservation of species).
196. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 115.
197. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115. The court carefully distinguished between monitoring and
regulation: "Incidental monitoring of Indian use to this end has carelessly been termed 'adminis-
tration' of Indian water by the state engineer." Id.
198. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
(Big Horn 111), 835 P.2d 273, 283 (Wyo. 1992).
199. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115; Big Horn 111, 835 P.2d at 283.
200. The excess waters are those beyond what it necessary to meet Winters rights and there-
fore subject to appropriation under state law.
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conduct has some substantial and direct effect on tribal health or wel-
fare, political integrity, or economic security.201 Although fragmented
administration of stream systems would seem almost by definition to
adversely affect tribal interests,202 courts have generally been willing
to authorize state regulation of non-Indian use of excess waters.
In one case, the Ninth Circuit held that the state had no authority
to regulate water in a creek system in Indian country, including no
authority to issue state appropriation permits in the creek.20 3 Three
years later, however, the court held that state regulation of non-Indian
water rights on the Spokane Reservation would not adversely impact
tribal interests.2 4 The court readily distinguished the two situations.
In the earlier case, the creek system was small and non-navigable, lo-
cated entirely within the reservation, and appropriations from it
would imperil tribal agricultural and fisheries use of the water.20 5 In
the later case, by contrast, the stream system flowed for most of its
length outside the Spokane Reservation, creating stronger state inter-
ests in regulating. 0 6 Similarly, as already noted, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that the State Engineer was authorized to en-
201. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,566 (1981). See also Brendale v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (White, J.) and 456-57 (Blackmun, J.) (1989); South Dakota v. Bour-
land, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1993). In Montana, the Court footnoted its articulation of this "di-
rect effects" test, stating that "[a]s a corollary, this Court has held that Indian tribes retain rights
to river waters necessary to make their reservations livable." Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 n.15.
202. See Williams, supra note 132, at 78-80 (arguing that the need for uniform regulation and
the fact that most water rights within reservations will be subject to tribal administration in any
case justify tribal primacy over all water administration in Indian country, subject to a "public
interest" standard).
In the context of water quality regulation under the Clean Water Act, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has asserted its understanding "that the activities regulated under the
various environmental statutes generally have serious and substantial impacts on human health
and welfare." 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,878 (1991). In particular, EPA stated that the Clean Water
Act "itself constitutes, in effect, a legislative determination that activities which affect surface
water and critical habitat quality may have serious and substantial impacts." Id. Accordingly,
EPA determined that tribes will usually be able to show serious and substantial effects on tribal
interests, and therefore will also be able to assert tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian
activities on fee lands within reservations. Id.
203. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton 1), 647 F.2d 42,51 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
204. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Holly v. Con-
federated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 655 F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (E.D. Wash.
1985), affd without opinion sub nor. Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 823 (1987) (holding that the Yakima Nation was without authority to extend its water
code to nonmembers diverting surplus waters, but declining to determine whether the state or
the federal government should regulate).
205. Walton 1, 647 F.2d at 52; Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365-66.
206. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366.
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force state appropriation water rights on the Wind River
Reservation.' 7
Both courts which held that the state was authorized to regulate
non-Indian use of water in Indian country emphasized that the state
could regulate only the excess water, not Indian reserved rightsY. 8
Both also stressed their belief that tribal rights would not be adversely
impacted because the state was charged with protecting the Winters
rights of the tribes.2" Commentators also have noted that state ad-
207. Big Horn I, supra note 31, at 114-15; In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Big Horn River System (Big Horn I1), 835 P.2d 273, 282-83 (Wyo. 1992). For
critiques of this aspect of the decisions, see Michelle Knapik, Note, Environmental Law-Who
Shall Administer Water Rights on the Wind River Reservation: Has Wyoming Halted an Environ-
mentally Sound Indian Water Management System, 12 TEMP. ENvnL. L. & TzCH. J. 233 (1993);
Eric Hannum, Comment, Administration of Reserved and Non-Reserved Water Rights on an In-
dian Reservation: Post-Adjudication Questions on the Big Horn River, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 681
(1992).
The court in Big Horn I specified that the engineer was empowered to enforce state law
with regard to state appropriators, but not to apply state law to tribal reserved rights. Subse-
quent to the decision, the Wind River tribes attempted to change the use of their future water to
an instream flow. When the state engineer refused to curtail junior state appropriators to ensure
the instream water for the tribes, they sought an injunction. The trial court removed the engi-
neer from administration of water rights on the Reservation, and made the tribes the sole admin-
istrator of all water rights in their territory. See Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 275-76. On appeal, the
Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court by a 3-2 decision, returning to the Big Horn
I approach.
The various rationales proposed by the justices of the majority, however, were of concern to
the tribes. Justice Macy believed that state law applied to the tribes' water rights and that the
state engineer could not be removed from administration of state water rights under the state
constitution. Big Horn II, 835 P.2d at 282-83. Justice Thomas proposed a unique approach. He
argued that a portion of the reservation had been diminished; that the engineer had full author-
ity to regulate water on that portion because it was no longer Indian country; and that therefore,
in the interests of unitary regulation, the engineer could also regulate water within the existing
reservation. Id. at 284. Justice Brown concurred with Macy and Thomas on the issue, on the
ground that dual water management would be impractical. Id. at 290. Justices C-rdine and
Golden dissented on the administration issue, and both expressly noted that state law is not
applicable to tribal reserved rights. Id. at 288 (Cardine) and 296 (Golden). Cardine proposed
joint tribal-state administration of the water, id. at 287-88, and Golden argued that the trial
court's substitution of the tribe for the state engineer was appropriate under the circumstances.
Id. at 297.
Given the lack of any majority rationale in Big Horn 11I, the majority decision to reinstate
the engineer gave the engineer authority only over state appropriation rights, not tribal reserved
rights. Justice Macy's opinion, considered the opinion of the court, reiterated those principles
from Big Horn L Big Horn 117, 835 P.2d at 283.
208. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365-66; Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 115. The Ninth Circuit further
specified that the state could only issue appropriation permits for waters in excess of those held
by the tribes. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365.
209. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365; Big Horn 11, 835 P.2d at 283. Where tribal rights to water
have not been quantified, state administration presents additional difficulties. If states grant
non-Indians the right to use water on fee lands within reservations, and that water is later deter-
mined to be tribal water under the Winters doctrine, the states will have created non-Indian
expectations in Indian water. Perhaps for that reason, the tribes of the Flathead Reservation are
seeking to enjoin the state from administering new water uses on the reservation prior to the
quantification of the tribes' rights to water. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the
35
Royster: A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ministration of appropriation rights should not affect tribal interests
because the state is obligated to take account of the prior and para-
mount tribal rights.210 Given the history of state indifference and
even hostility to tribal water rights, however, not all tribes may be
willing to trust the states in this regard, at least not without coopera-
tive agreements or enforcement mechanisms.
VI. DETERMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS
Tribal rights under the Winters doctrine have traditionally been
determined through judicial litigation. While both federal and state
courts can have jurisdiction to determine Indian reserved lights to
water, a federal abstention doctrine makes state courts the forum of
choice. And while both federal and state courts are bound to follow
federal law, the choice of forum can have an effect on the substantive
law of Winters rights. Perhaps as a consequence, given all the uncer-
tainties attendant upon a judicial determination of water rights, nego-
tiated settlements of tribal claims to water are becoming increasingly
common.
A. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Although tribal rights to water are federal rights, they may under
certain circumstances be adjudicated in state court. In 1952, Congress
enacted the McCarran Amendment, which expressly permitted the
joinder of the federal government in state suits involving the adjudica-
tion of water rights in river systems.211 The Supreme Court subse-
quently determined, in a case involving federal reserved water rights
for a national forest, that the McCarran Amendment authorized state
courts to determine federally reserved water rights as part of general
stream adjudications.2 2 The Court noted that the purpose of the
Amendment, to ensure that all the rights in a stream system could be
adjudicated in a general proceeding, would be undermined if federal
reserved rights were omitted from system-wide adjudications.213 Five
years later, in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
Flathead Reservation v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's
grant of a stay of the tribes' federal action until state court proceedings are complete).
210. See Getches, supra note 161, at 432; Fick, supra note 168, at 105.
211. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
212. United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
213. Id. at 525.
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States,214 the Court extended that reasoning to state court adjudica-
tions of tribal reserved rights to water.215
The Colorado River case did more, however, than merely allow
state courts concurrent jurisdiction to determine tribal reserved rights.
Instead, the Court created a new abstention doctrine based on princi-
ples of "wise judicial administration".216 The United States had filed
suit in federal court to determine reserved rights for various federal
and Indian reservations, naming state law water users as defendants.
Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants sought to add the United
States as a party defendant to an on-going state adjudication. The
Supreme Court ruled that, given the McCarran Amendment policy
against piecemeal adjudication of water rights and the fact that no
meaningful progress had been made in the federal court proceeding,
the federal court should abstain in favor of the state court
proceeding.217
214. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
215. Id. The Court noted that "bearing in mind the ubiquitous nature of Indian water rights
in the Southwest, it is clear that a construction of the Amendment excluding those rights from its
coverage would enervate the Amendment's objective." ld. at 811. The Court's decision has
been widely criticized for failing to "confront the strong countervailing interests of the United
States and the American Indians in presenting their reserved rights claims to a federal forum."
Robert H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1130-31 (1978). See also Peter
Toren, Comment, The Adjudication of Indian Water Rights in State Courts, 19 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 27
(1984); Michael Lieder, Note, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amend-
ment: Two Courts Are Better Than One, 71 GEo. Li. 1023 (1983); JeffTaylor & Duane Birdbear,
Note, State Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Indian Reserved Water Rights, 18 NAT. REsOURCES J. 221
(1978). But see Jack D. Palma II, Indian Water Rights: A State Perspective After Akin, 57 NEB. L.
REv. 295, 310-18 (1978) (arguing that state court adjudication is necessary to avoid uncertainty
and disruption of state water rights).
The Colorado River case concerned reserved rights in Colorado, one of the few western
states without a disclaimer clause over Indian lands in its enabling act. Subsequently, the Court
determined that "whatever limitation" enabling act disclaimer clauses may have placed on state
adjudications of Indian reserved rights to water, "those limitations were removed by the McCar-
ran Amendment." Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,564 (1983). The Montana
Supreme Court subsequently determined that the state constitutional disclaimer clause, as a mat-
ter of state law, did not bar state court adjudication of tribal reserved rights. Montana ex rel
Greely v. Confederated Salish Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 760-62 (Mont. 1985).
Moreover, the McCarran Amendment apparently applies to state proceedings to determine
water rights, even if those proceedings include a significant administrative component. One dis-
trict court ruled that Oregon's proceedings, which begin with administrative hearings and find-
ings of fact that are then reviewed in a judicial hearing, constituted a "suit . . . for the
adjudication" of water rights within the meaning of the McCarran Amendment. United States v.
Oregon Water Resources Dep't, 774 F. Supp. 1568, 1576 (D.Or. 1991). See also Michael D.
White, McCarran Amendment Adjudications-Problems, Solutions, Alternatives, 22 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 619, 628 (1987) (arguing that states should be authorized to determine reserved
water rights in purely administrative proceedings affecting only those federal rights).
216. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
217. Id. at 819-20. The Court subsequently ruled that the abstention doctrine should apply
even if the federal proceeding was brought by the tribe rather than the United States and sought
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Despite the preference for abstention, the Court ruled that the
McCarran Amendment does not divest federal courts of their concur-
rent jurisdiction to determine federally reserved water rights.218 Sub-
sequent federal decisions refusing to abstain, however, have been
rare. In 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to
abstain in favor of the state court, citing a number of differences from
the facts in Colorado River.z1 9 The circuit court noted that at the time
the federal lawsuit was filed, no state proceedings were underway; in
fact, seven years later, the state proceedings had not progressed be-
yond the fact-gathering stage.22 Accordingly, the court ruled that to
dismiss a completed federal court determination of federal rights
would result in duplicate efforts and a waste of judicial resources. 221
Moreover, the court noted that the federal lawsuit sought to deter-
mine only the federal-law issue of priority of reserved rights, and
therefore would not intrude on the role of the state court in any gen-
eral stream adjudication. 2' Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also declined
to adjudicate only Indian rights to water. San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 565-69. The Court in
San Carlos Apache premised the abstention doctrine on its assumption "that the state adjudica-
tions are adequate to quantify the rights at issue in the federal suits". On remand, the Ninth
Circuit refused to determine whether the state proceeding was "adequate," finding that the issue
was one "best decided by the state courts in the first instance." Northern Cheyenne 'libe v.
Adsit, 721 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1983).
In addition, the Court in San Carlos Apache addressed the tribes' claim that while the Mc-
Carran Amendment may have waived federal sovereign immunity, it did not waive tribal sover-
eign immunity. The Court agreed in part: "although the McCarran Amendment did not waive
the sovereign immunity of Indians as parties to state comprehensive water adjudications, it did
(as we made quite clear in Colorado River) waive sovereign immunity with regard to the Indian
rights at issue in those proceedings." San Carlos, 463 U.S. at 566 n.17 (emphasis in original).
Recently, a Supreme Court decision on sovereign immunity has raised questions about whether
tribes are subject to state water adjudications under the McCarran Amendment. United States
v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992). The Court held that a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity must be express in the text of the statute and that if there is another "plausible" interpreta-
tion of the text, that ambiguity means no waiver. Id. Courts have, however, ruled that Nordic
Village does not affect the traditional interpretation of the McCarran Amendment. See United
States v. Oregon Water Resources Dep't, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10832 (D. Or. 1992). See also
Idaho Dep't of Water Resources v. United States, 832 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993). But see Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court's New Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of
Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. Rnv. 433 (1994).
218. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-20.
219. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404-07 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984).
220. Id. at 1404-05.
221. Id. at 1405-06. But see Matthew Reynolds, Note, Water Law-The Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction in Reserved Water Rights Litigation, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 511 (1985) (arguing
that while the Adair court had little practical option other than to affirm federal retention of the
case, none of the factors cited by the court warranted federal jurisdiction under the Supreme
Court's guidelines in Colorado River and San Carlos Apache).
222. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1406. But see Mikel L. Moore & John B. Weldon, Jr., General Water-
Rights Adjudication in Arizona: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 27 ARiz. L. REv. 709, 722
38
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss1/2
1994] INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
to order abstention in favor of a general stream adjudication where
the federal court was asked to interpret the rights of the Yakima Na-
tion to fisheries water under a federal consent decree awarding non-
Indian irrigation rights. 223 Despite these instances of federal retention
of reserved rights cases, most tribal Winters rights to water will, as a
practical matter, likely be determined in state court general stream
adjudications.
When Indian reserved rights are adjudicated in state court pro-
ceedings, the state courts are obligated to determine those rights
under federal law. 4 The McCarran Amendment is procedural only,
and "in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian rights in
state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much as
federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law. ' 21
Nonetheless, the state and federal courts have often taken quite dif-
ferent approaches to fundamental issues in Winters rights adjudica-
tions, 226 fracturing what should be a uniform federal law of Indian
water rights. Tribes may thus have little reason to believe that state
courts will follow their obligation under Colorado River to fairly de-
termine Indian reserved rights to water under federal law.227
(1985) ("Requiring a state court to 'plug' the federal determination of reserved rights into the
broader state decree is unworkable.").
223. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1034-35
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 474 U.S.
1032 (1985) ("The parties intended no general adjudication of water rights and no party moved
to dismiss the federal suit.").
224. Professor Tarlock contends that: "In practice, the effect of Colorado River may be over-
exaggerated as the substance of Winters rights are much more important than the forum of their
adjudication." Tarlock, supra note 20, at 661; see also Elizabeth McCallister, Note, Water Rights:
The McCarren [sic] Amendment and Indian Tribes' Reserved Water Rights, 4 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 303, 307 (1976). The difficulty is that the forum may in fact affect the substance. See infra
text accompanying notes 226-227.
225. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,571 (1983). See also Montana ex rel
Greely v. Confederated Salish Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 765-66 (Mont. 1985)("We hold that
state courts are required to follow federal law with regard to [Indian reserved] water rights.").
226. Section III of this primer is rife with examples, particularly of disparate approaches
taken by the Ninth Circuit and the Wyoming Supreme Court. As noted at various points in that
section, some justices on the Wyoming Supreme Court have asserted their belief that state law
controls the exercise of tribal reserved rights to water.
227. Tribes fear that state economic interests in the water, the vulnerability of state court
judges to reelection concerns, and the actual or perceived historic bias of state courts against
Indian interests will all preclude fair adjudication of Indian reserved rights. See Abrams, supra
note 215, at 1131-32 and 1141-44; Donald D. MacIntyre, Quantification of Indian Reserved Water
Rights in Montana: State ex reL Greely in the Footsteps of San Carlos Apache Tribe, 8 PuB. LAND
L. REv. 33, 54-58 (1987). Those tribal concerns are not unfounded. As noted by a special
assistant attorney general in the Big Horn litigation: "States and their water users not only want
certainty, but also a little justice, at least for themselves.... Justice, at least from that viewpoint,
dictates that whatever resolution may be reached, [it] will not injure present users." White,
supra note 215, at 625. See also Orem, supra note 130, at 460 (arguing that the danger of incon-
sistent state and federal decrees "should outweigh the contentions that Indian water rights will
39
Royster: A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions than Answers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
B. The Settlement Alternative
The use of litigation to determine tribal rights to water has addi-
tional potential drawbacks. Litigation, particularly in the context of a
state general stream adjudication, is lengthy and expensive, resulting
in a determination of paper rights to water but delivering no actual
water to reservation economies and providing no funds for future de-
livery.2' Those disadvantages, coupled with litigation in a potentially
hostile forum, have led to increasing use of negotiated settlements.
Settlements offer both tribes and states advantages over pro-
tracted litigation. Negotiated settlements are flexible to accommodate
local needs, and they provide cheaper and faster resolution of difficult
issues. Tribes receive "wet" water rather than mere paper rights, and
states gain the desired certainty of water rights.229 In addition, tribes
are often able to bargain for aspects of Winters rights that are un-
resolved by the courts, such as access to groundwater, change in use of
the PIA water right, and off-reservation water marketing. 30
Nonetheless, settlement of reserved rights to water has its critics.
Tribes invariably give up some measure of their legal rights to water in
the course of settlement negotiations.231 If water quantity and priority
issues are not first determined by a court, tribes may find themselves
in a weak bargaining position for concessions on other important is-
sues.232 As a result, tribes may prefer to litigate certain basic reserved
rights issues, in particular the tribal right to water, priority date, and
not receive just adjudication in state courts before judges elected by a popular, non-Indian
majority.").
The Klamath Tribe recently argued that subjecting the determination of its water rights to
state proceedings violated its due process right to an impartial decision maker. United States v.
Oregon Water Resources Dep't, 774 F. Supp. 1568, 1579 (D. Or. 1991). The federal court, how-
ever, found that the tribe had failed to produce evidence that, simply because the state had
litigated against the tribe on its treaty rights, the state would not be impartial in determining the
tribe's water rights. Id.
228. See John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes
Involving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63, 69 (1988); Gina McGovern, Note, Settlement
or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 195, 197 (1994); Dana
Upite, Note, Resolving Indian Reserved Water Rights in the Wake of San Carlos Apache Tribe, 15
ENvTL. L. 181, 198 (1984).
229. Upite, supra note 228, at 199.
230. PETER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETrLEme_,T MANUAL 193 (1988); McGov-
ern, supra note 228, at 218. See generally supra Section II.
231. BURTON, supra note 41, at 80-81.
232. See Indian Water Rights Disputes, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 96 (1982); Folk-Williams,
supra note 228, at 70, 100.
[Vol. 30:61
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quantification, before they negotiate water rights settlements with the
states.33
Despite potential drawbacks to negotiation, settlement of Indian
rights to water has become increasingly common since the 1970s 4
and likely will continue to be a preferred method of determining the
scope and extent of Winters rights. The most significant barrier to set-
tlement may be the history of mutual distrust between the tribes and
states; advocates of negotiated settlements posit that successful water
rights settlements may not only provide both tribes and states with the
water they need, but foster an increased spirit of general governmen-
tal cooperation.
VII. WINTERS RIGHTS IN RIPARIAN JURISDICTIONS
As noted earlier, no case has ever conclusively determined
whether the Winters doctrine of tribal reserved rights to water extends
to tribes whose reservations are located in riparian or dual riparian/
appropriation states. Instead, the doctrine has thus far developed
largely against the backdrop of the prior appropriation system of state
water rights.235
A. Winters Rights in Riparian States
No court has ever adjudicated a tribal claim to Winters rights in a
purely riparian jurisdiction. A lawsuit brought by the Seminole Tribe
in Florida23 6 that might have addressed the issue was settled by enact-
ment of the Florida Indian (Seminole) Land Claims Settlement Act of
1987,23 which incorporated the Seminole Water Rights Compact as
federal law.3 s The Compact did not quantify Seminole water rights,
but rather recognized the Tribe's rights to a percentage of the water
233. Folk-Williams, supra note 228, at 70-71; Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights:
Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated Settlements and Their Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L. 151, 172
(1992).
234. See SLY, supra note 230, at 25-26.
235. Id. at 192-93.
236. Florida is no longer a "pure" riparian jurisdiction, in the sense that it has altered its
common-law riparian doctrine by instituting a state permit system for riparian uses. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 373.203-249 (West 1983).
237. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1772-1772g (1988).
238. 25 U.S.C. § 1772e (1988). The Compact is reprinted in Seminole Indian Land Claims
Settlement Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1684 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-122 (1987) [hereinafter Seminole Hearing]. See generally Jim Shore &
Jerry C. Straus, The Seminole Water Rights Compact and the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1987, 6 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1 (1990); Barbara S. Monahan, Note, Florida's
Seminole Indian Land Claims Agreemen" Vehicle for an Innovative Water Rights Compact, 15
AM. INDIAN L. Rav. 341 (1991).
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available from specified sources.3 9 Pursuant to the Compact, the
Tribe agreed to comply with most of the non-procedural "terms and
principles" of the state water system, although Seminole water rights
are perpetual in contrast to state water rights, which are subject to
periodic renewal by the state.2' Regulation of Seminole water use is
the exclusive province of the Tribe; neither the state nor the regional
water management district has any administrative control over the
Tribe's water use, although the Tribe is obligated to provide notice of
its uses by filing an annual plan with the water management district.241
B. Winters Rights in Dual-System States
The Supreme Court has confirmed Winters rights, without modifi-
cation, for Indian reservations in California, a dual riparian/appropria-
tion state.242 In Arizona v. California, the United States asserted
claims to water on behalf of five reservations, three of which are lo-
cated in whole or in part in California.243 All five reservations were
awarded water rights in the Colorado River based on the Winters doc-
trine, quantified by the PIA standard. Although the Court did not
address the fact that some of the reservations were located in a dual
system state, the case may indicate the Court's willingness to apply the
Winters doctrine in riparian and dual-system jurisdictions.
In addition to Winters rights, tribes may also be able to assert
state-law riparian rights to water for additional purposes not covered
by their reserved rights. The California Supreme Court held, in the
context of non-Indian lands, that federally-reserved lands are entitled
to riparian rights under state law.244 The court noted that while the
federal lands carried a reserved right to water to meet the primary
purposes of the reservation, the federal government also had riparian
rights in a national forest for water to meet the secondary purposes of
the reservation.245 In so holding, the court relied on the Supreme
Court decision in United States v. New Mexico, in which the Court
239. Seminole Water Rights Compact at 25-27, reprinted in Seminole Hearing, supra note 238,
at 111-13. The percentage was generally 15%.
240. Seminole Hearing, supra note 238, at 41-42.
241. Id. at 43-44.
242. Oklahoma is now ostensibly a dual-system state. See Franco.American Charolaise, Ltd.
v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
243. 373 U.S. at 600. Of the five reservations at issue, see id. at 595 n.97, the Chemehuevi
Reservation is located in California and small portions of the Colorado River and Fort Mohave
Reservations extend into that state as well.
244. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, 749 P.2d 324 (Cal. 1988).
245. Ld. at 327-30.
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held that non-Indian federal reservations carried an implied right to
water necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation.
246
The Court noted, however, that the federal government could seek
water for secondary purposes under state law. Based on those princi-
ples, the California court recognized the federal government's right to
seek riparian rights for purposes not covered by reserved rights
water.247 Under state law, however, in order to avoid disruption of
settled water rights, the State Water Resources Control Board could
subordinate the riparian rights to any appropriative rights authorized
before the riparian right was exercised. 248
While the applicability of New Mexico's primary-purpose test to
Indian reservations is doubtful,249 the California court's reasoning
should be applicable to Indian lands. In other words, Indian tribes
should be entitled to perfect water rights under state law over and
above their Winters rights. In appropriation states, tribes could ac-
quire appropriation rights under state law; in riparian or dual-system
states, tribes could assert their riparian rights. For tribes, these state-
law rights could help offset the rulings of some courts that Winters
rights cannot be used for purposes other than agricultural uses.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The tribal reserved right to water has long been a dormant issue
in Oklahoma. For the most part, the tribes have not asserted and the
state has not taken account of Winters rights. As the state seeks to
clarify its water laws, however, it would be negligent to ignore the
claims of 36 tribes to the water resources. The tribes in Oklahoma
also would benefit by early assertion and determination of tribal
claims to water. One of the clear lessons of the appropriation states is
that the more entrenched the state system becomes and the scarcer
the water resource, the greater the hostility when tribes assert their
reserved rights to water. As Oklahoma struggles with the appropriate
state system of water allocation, it has a unique opportunity, in con-
246. 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
247. The New Mexico Court stated that the federal government could "acquire water [for
secondary purposes] in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator." New
Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702. As the California court noted, however, New Mexico recognized only
appropriation rights. California, by contrast, recognized both appropriation and riparian rights.
Accordingly, the court held, the United States could acquire water for secondary purposes in the
same manner as any other public or private entity: that is, by the assertion of riparian rights.
Hallett Creek, 749 P.2d at 330.
248. lId at 336-38.
249. See 4 WATERS, supra note 5, at 219-20; COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 583-84.
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junction with the tribes, to develop a system which accommodates and
accounts for tribal rights to water at the outset. Whether Oklahoma
and the Indian tribes take advantage of that opportunity will affect
water resources and tribal-state relations for decades to come.
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